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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The design of large and complex systems typically begins with various solution
concepts to meet system requirements, which must eventually be pared down to a single
design. Depending on the system there may be multiple rounds of down-selection, and
multiple designs may be taken further than an original concept (DoD, 2011; NASA,
2007). How does the system engineer decide which concept or concepts to carry forward?
How is an objective analysis of the alternatives performed? In one form or another, an
engineering trade study will be performed. The National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) Systems Engineering Handbook defines a trade study as, “A
means of evaluating system designs by devising alternative means to meet functional
requirements, evaluating these alternatives in terms of the measures of effectiveness and
system cost, ranking the alternatives according to appropriate selection criteria, dropping
less promising alternatives, and proceeding to the next level of resolution, if needed”
(NASA, 2007 pg. 277). The resources at stake during the course of a trade study can be
large. For example, the 2007 NASA budget included $3.9 billion to begin development
on a Space Shuttle replacement. The cost of Space Shuttle missions at that time had been
more than $4 billion per year (Dumbacher, 2006b). In committing almost $4 billion to
developing a new system, with an expectation of that system consuming billions of
1

dollars each year during operation, NASA considered a number of options and included
variations of existing and new technologies in potential designs (Dumbacher, 2006a;
Sumrall, 2006). In the case of a NASA crew vehicle, as with many Department of
Defense (DoD) and commercial applications, human safety is also a factor. With many
billions of dollars and possibly human lives at stake, the importance of an optimal
outcome to an engineering trade study is clear.
Among numerous methods of analyzing trade study alternatives and making
decisions, Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) processes are used extensively in
systems engineering as an objective, systematic framework for making important
programmatic and design decisions. These processes have been carefully designed,
revised, and studied in an effort to make them reliably yield an optimal solution based on
elicited information when an engineering team seeks to determine which of two or more
options is superior. Such processes are prescribed in the U.S. DoD, NASA, Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), and throughout private industry (DoD, 2011; NASA,
2007; FAA, 2006). The consequences of MCDA outcomes can be tremendous, with
large systems valued in the billions of dollars and with human safety often in the balance.
Unaccounted-for biases, or expected biases that are not present, could adversely impact a
trade study and lead to a sub-optimal decision. The author of a seminal paper in the field
of MCDA, Bernard Roy, said in a more recent article, “In many cases, those who claim to
shed light objectively on a decision take a stand – consciously or unconsciously – for an a
priori position or for a prevailing hypothesis which they then seek to justify” (2004, pg.
6).
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MCDA as used in systems engineering has roots in decision theory from the
disciplines of psychology and economics. Volumes of research have been published from
these disciplines concerning the way that people make decisions and the factors affecting
human decision making. In terms of economic research, these volumes most often
concern either marketing to consumers or decisions between various investment options.
As such, they study general populations or certain subgroups, such as entrepreneurs or
bankers. They do not tend to involve engineers as a group or engineering design
decisions. Nonetheless, the research from a business perspective is assumed to apply
similarly in engineering decisions.
Classic economic decision theory assumes that the individual decision maker will
always maximize utility. Maximizing utility may be maximizing revenue or profits,
minimizing costs, mitigating risks, or some other measure. Game theory also assumes
rational actors. People are presumed to behave in a predictable, logical and repeatable
way. Uncertainty is accepted as a by-product of imperfect information. In other words, a
decision maker may not arrive at an optimal solution, but they do so because they were
given faulty, incomplete or uncertain information on which to base their decisions. They
are still assumed to have acted rationally to maximize utility based on whatever
information was available to them. The Savage axioms and other classic implementations
of expected utility theories depend on this behavior (Savage, 1954).
Researchers have shown during the last half century that the assumption of
rational actors in decision making is not always upheld. Numerous biases and aversions
have been studied which, in effect, lead individuals to act irrationally or in a way that
may not maximize utility. An early challenge to the Savage axioms came in the form of a
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phenomenon called ambiguity aversion (Ellsberg, 1961). It was experimentally
demonstrated that individuals will choose an unambiguous option over an ambiguous
one, even when the probabilities are the same and even when it is carefully explained that
the probabilities are the same. In the 1970s, a large body of research developed to
demonstrate that decisions differed based on how information was presented to the
decision maker (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). This ultimately led to research on the
status quo bias, which demonstrated that an individual will ascribe an unjustifiably high
value to something they already own or to a currently existing condition or state
(Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). In other words, individuals show preference toward
their current state, even if another state is objectively equal or superior. Research on these
and many other biases and aversions has continued over the last twenty-five years.
The research on ambiguity aversion and status quo bias has to date focused on
business-related decisions and populations. The focus of this dissertation is to investigate
the existence and relative strength of these sources of irrational decision making in
engineers. Understanding the nature of these biases in the perspective of engineers and
MCDA processes may allow improved conduct and interpretation of engineering trade
studies.
1.1 Background
In economic decision theory research, ambiguity aversion has been defined as the
preference for gambles with known as opposed to unknown probabilities, and is now
considered to be well accepted in economics as a way to explain certain market
phenomena (Roca, Hogarth, and Maule, 2006). Status quo bias has been defined simply
as a tendency to disproportionately choose the status quo, an existing condition or state
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(Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). These concepts have been linked in research as types
of framing effects (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), and are considered different but
related results of the concept of comparative ignorance, in which individuals are strongly
influenced based on their perceived level of knowledge on a topic in comparison to the
perceived level of knowledge of others (Fox and Tversky, 1995). Economic research into
these areas has focused on characterizing these effects and how they cause deviations
from expected utility in decision making, and on ways to create rational frameworks that
include these effects or predict their impact. Systems engineering research in MCDA and
related fields has sought to overcome these effects in engineering trade studies with the
use of complex algorithms, elicitation methods and multi-path approaches. The systems
engineering research accepts ambiguity aversion and status quo bias as extant in
engineering decisions just as it is in economic decisions.
Current research has continued to explore ambiguity aversion and status quo bias
in a variety of applications and models in decision theory (Ortoleva, 2009). A significant
need remains to determine whether and to what degree engineers experience and exhibit
these effects, how they differ or relate to the general population and business-related
populations, and what impact any differences in the engineering population could have
on the outcome of MCDA processes.
1.2 Research Objectives
Fields in which objective decision making is critical, such as systems engineering,
depend on decision analysis approaches that reliably yield an optimal outcome to a
decision process. The myriad variants of MCDA are intended to provide a repeatable
decision making process that overcomes sources of error to lead a decision-maker to the
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best available decision in each scenario. MCDA in systems engineering accepts the
existence of certain biases, and addresses these biases in ways ranging from a simple
caution to complex algorithms.
Of the numerous biases noted throughout economic and psychological research,
few are as universally acknowledged as the status quo bias and ambiguity aversion. Many
MCDA processes are intended to overcome, or at least mitigate, these cognitive effects
and the impact they might have on an outcome. While they have been well established in
other areas, the status quo bias and ambiguity aversion have only been assumed to
operate the same way in engineers as they do in others. These effects have not been
demonstrated in engineers as a group and have not been well characterized in systems
engineering literature. This leaves open the possibility that the assumptions on their
existence in engineers are not correct, and that, at best, MCDA researchers are spending
resources to overcome something they need not worry about, and, at worst, that MCDA
processes are returning sub-optimal outcomes in some cases.
This dissertation considered two primary questions: Do engineers exhibit the
status quo bias, and do they exhibit it to the same degree as the general population? Do
engineers exhibit ambiguity aversion, and do they exhibit it to the same degree as the
general population? These two central questions are at the foundation of the present
research.
This dissertation further considers some secondary questions that will be
addressed given an appropriate set of results. These secondary questions concern
numerous demographic factors. First, do engineering managers exhibit these biases
differently than working-level engineers, and, if so, to what degree? Additionally, is there
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a difference in these biases between individuals who work in a predominantly team
environment versus a predominantly working group environment? Could there be a
difference between the manifestations of these biases in different types of decisions?
Differences between various basic demographic groups will also be investigated.
1.3 Significance/Importance of Research
Engineering trade studies are often extremely high-stakes affairs with huge dollar
values or significant environmental, health and safety implications riding on the
outcomes. The importance of getting optimal outcomes from such decision making
processes is thus difficult to overstate. The results have wide-ranging impacts. As such, it
is important that the factors affecting the outcome be well understood. These factors
include human bias that can be introduced into weighting, scoring and selection criteria.
An incorrectly assumed bias or aversion could lead to an extremely costly sub-optimal
MCDA outcome.
This research effort is designed to determine whether and to what degree
engineers exhibit the status quo bias and ambiguity aversion. A confirmation of engineers
acting in a manner similar to the general population will endorse the MCDA research that
seeks to overcome, eliminate or mitigate such bias in decision making. Results that
indicate no bias or an opposite bias will indicate that new approaches by some MCDA
researchers and by engineering managers may be in order. This effort further desires to
investigate any differences in decision making based on managerial status, primary
working environment and other demographic factors, all of which would be instructive to
confirm similarity or to expose potential disparities. It is further desired to provide some
indication of a need for future work on whether there is a difference in the type of bias
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exhibited based on the type of problem addressed, namely financial decisions versus
engineering design decisions. These outcomes are all applicable to leaders and
organizations seeking to make optimal decisions with MCDA type processes.
1.4 Summary
The body of decision making research suggests that status quo bias and ambiguity
aversion are cognitive biases seen in the general population. MCDA research assumes
that the biases as demonstrated in economic research and psychology apply to systems
engineers in the same manner. Decision makers in numerous organizations apply these
processes with the same understanding of possible biases, with huge impacts resulting
from the outcome of the decision making process. Nonetheless, these biases have not
been demonstrated to act in systems engineers as they do in other populations that have
been studied.
The subject of this research is to determine whether and to what extent engineers
exhibit the status quo bias and ambiguity aversion compared to the populations
previously studied. This research further aims to study whether certain demographics
factors like managerial status or primary working environment impact these biases. This
research will contribute to the understanding of cognitive biases as they impact
engineering trade studies.
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1

Introduction
There exist numerous methods for making decisions, ranging from simple

heuristics to complex systems. Groups may make decisions by simple voting or
consensus, or by a more structured use of expert opinions, such as the Delphi Method.
Individuals may make decisions by satisficing - or stopping with the first acceptable
option, simple lists of pros and cons, elimination by aspects, or even random choice
(Goodwin and Wright, 2009). Computer-based decision support systems and related aids
may also be used. Heuristics are experience-based methods of simplifying and solving
problems or decisions. Heuristics such as the availability heuristic, representativeness
heuristic, and anchoring and adjustment heuristic may be employed by a decision maker
(Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982). MCDA encompasses approaches to
systematically choose between two or more alternatives in a logical, quantitative
framework. These approaches are used to make decisions of significant impact in systems
engineering, and are more generically known as engineering trade studies (Goodwin and
Wright, 2009). This study focuses on MCDA processes due to their common usage in the
field of systems engineering, and the large body of research devoted to making these
various systems resistant to bias. The present literature review considered biases noted in
9

economic decision theory research and their application in systems engineering. Two
particular biases are the focus of the review: Status Quo Bias and Ambiguity Aversion.
These are considered along with related effects and biases known in economics and
psychology. The emphasis is on how these cognitive biases studied in different fields
might impact engineering decisions made using MCDA decision making techniques.
2.2 Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis
2.2.1

Origin and Fundamentals of MCDA
The MCDA field is considered to have begun in the 1960s, with what is widely

considered the first work in the field being written by Roy (1968) on what he called the
ELimination and Choice Expressing REality (ELECTRE) method, now commonly
referred to as outranking. Keeney and Raiffa (1976) wrote the first comprehensive book
on the subject of MCDA, laying out the general methods of MCDA decision making as a
follow-up to Raiffa’s more general text. This was followed by Morris’ (1977) book on
Decision Analysis, which sought to provide a simpler more accessible handbook of
decision making methods and bring the field into more mainstream use. Throughout the
1970s and 1980s, MCDA research included the fields of Economic Decision Theory and
Psychology, and reached back to various economic theories that predated Roy’s original
paper (Von Winterfeldt and Ward, 1986). By the 1990s, MCDA was a relatively mature
field with applications across many areas of study from social sciences to business to
engineering (Keefer, Kirkwood, and Corner, 2004). Concern about issues with MCDA,
including cognitive biases, were mentioned by Keefer (Keefer, Kirkwood, and Corner,
2004 pg. 18).
“The coverage of decision analysis in many OR/MS textbooks
largely focuses on mechanics and thematics and omits such
10

important topics as problem structuring, probability assessment,
cognitive biases, and discretization of continuous distributions.”
Keefer went on to emphasize that the literature has largely ignored the possible
issues in MCDA mechanics that could be caused by demonstrated cognitive biases
(2004). Even public policy decisions were suggested as an area in which MCDA could be
used (Gamper and Turcanu, 2004; Mabin et al, 2001). Mabin (Mabin et al, 2001) showed
concern for the appearance of bias in public policy decisions and worried that individuals
would second-guess outcomes or tweak weights until they got their preferred outcome. In
engineering, MCDA is often referred to as simply decision analysis, or is used
interchangeably with the expression “engineering trade studies.” MCDA has become a
fundamental tool in systems engineering and is found in systems engineering guides
published by NASA (2007), Defense Acquisition University (DAU) (DoD, 2011) and the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) (2006). The NASA Systems Engineering
Handbook (NASA, 2007) delineates one process of conducting a trade study, and is
nearly ubiquitous in use as a reference by engineering organizations. This handbook also
cautions against bias as it states, “MCDA involves a certain element of subjectiveness;
the bias and position of the team implementing MCDA play a significant part in the
accuracy and fairness of decisions” (NASA, 2007 pg. 211). Authors continue to write
handbooks on the use of MCDA quantitative processes, with warnings against errors that
can be introduced by overuse of engineering judgment (Daniels, Werner, and Bahill,
2001), and suggest integrated use of the many current MCDA processes that are in
practice (Belton and Stewart, 2002).
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2.2.2

MCDA Methods
Many frameworks for performing MCDA exist, with the most commonly cited

being Roy’s (1968) outranking method, Analytic Hierarchy Process(AHP) (Saaty 1990a),
Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) (Wallenius et al, 2008), Evidential Reasoning
(ER) approach (Xu and Yang, 2001), Technique for the Order of Prioritization by
Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) (Hwang and Yoon, 1981), Simple Multi-Attribute
Ranking Technique (SMART) (Goodwin and Wright, 2009) and Measuring
Attractiveness by a Categorical-Based Evaluation TecHnique (MACBETH) (Goodwin
and Wright, 2009). All of the MCDA methods ultimately involve some form of the
following: determination of alternatives, selection of scoring criteria, weighting of criteria
and scoring alternatives according to the criteria selected. One of the simplest systems,
SMART, describes eight stages of the total process:
•

Stage 1, Identify the decision-maker;

•

Stage 2, Identify the alternative courses of action;

•

Stage 3, Identify the attributes that are relevant to the decision problem;

•

Stage 4, For each attribute, assign values to measure the performance of
the alternatives on that attribute;

•

Stage 5, Determine a weight for each attribute;

•

Stage 6, For each alternative, take a weighted average of the values
assigned to that alternative;

•

Stage 7, Make a provisional decision; and
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•

Stage 8, Perform sensitivity analysis to see how robust the decision is to
changes in the figures supplied by the decision-maker (Goodwin and
Wright, 2009).

Bias can impact several stages of the process, beginning with which alternatives
are allowed to enter the process (Botten, 2004). A bias in identifying and weighting
attributes may cause the individual to choose only attributes more favorable to a preferred
option, or to weight those more heavily than is appropriate. The assignment of values for
each attribute is also a clear avenue for the impact of any bias, as the individual would
tend to grant higher scores to the favored option. In the final three stages, bias may cause
the individual to overlook the provisional decision or any lack of robustness. In short,
bias can impact every area of the study and thus heavily impact the final outcome
(Hämäläinen, 2003; Wallenius et al, 2008).
In addition to his 1990 paper introducing AHP, Saaty (1990b) published a book
intended to make the process available to managers and decision-makers. He addresses
possible cognitive biases in his book, warning about developing certain expectations
based on habits that are not necessarily correct (Saaty, 1990b). In his paper on MAUT,
Wallenius (Wallenius et al, 2008) states concern over biases in weighting elicitation
based on behavioral research, and states the need for further research related to cognitive
biases that explore the impact of contextual issues on the potential introduction of bias.
Numerous researchers have pursued ways to make more robust system design choices
(Kalsi, Hacker, and Lewis, 2001), incorporate simplifying methods in the process
(Hammond, Keeney, and Raiffa, 1998), and accommodate imprecise weighting and
scoring information (Chen, 2011a; Chen, 2011b; Deng, 1999). Kalsi (Kalsi, Hacker, and
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Lewis, 2001) expresses the belief that robust design can minimize effects of any kind of
variation or uncertainty without having to eliminate the source of the uncertainty or
variation. Along the same lines, Deng (1999) claims that his system can handle the
uncertainty and imprecision that are inherent in human subjectivity. Unal (Unal et al,
2005) sought to reduce imprecise inputs with a method to calibrate experts involved in
the process, noting that differences between expert disposition and confidence could
induce error. Later work by Saaty (Saaty and Begjcevic, 2010) attempted to incorporate
human values into MCDA. Other research focuses primarily on applications of MCDA
rather than the systems themselves (Miles and von Winterfeldt, 2007; Thomas, 2009;
Kauffmann et al, 2000). In his paper on a model for implementing MCDA, Kauffmann
(Kauffmann et al, 2000) expresses the belief that his model reduces subjectivity and
encourages organizational focus on the merits of a program. Zeleny (1998) sought to
incorporate qualitative human judgments, and later explored what it meant to come to an
optimal solution. All of these sources described various algorithms and schemes. While
many acknowledge the potential problem of bias, it is still largely ignored in MCDA.
2.2.3

Bias and Errors in MCDA
The literature openly acknowledges inherent subjectivity and potential bias in an

MCDA process. Roy (2004, pg. 6) in a recent publication states, “In many cases, those
who claim to shed light objectively on a decision take a stand – consciously or
unconsciously – for an a priori position or for a prevailing hypothesis which they then
seek to justify.” Roy (2004) goes on to assume a strong desire for objectivity by
participants limits the impact of subjectivity on decision making. Gamper (Gamper and
Turcanu, 2004) discusses the use of MCDA for public policy decisions and states under
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the weaknesses column that groups may increase their own power through information
bias. In other words, stakeholders in some situations will introduce bias in the
information they provide. In a response to Keefer (Keefer, Kirkwood, and Corner, 2004),
Hämäläinen (2003) expresses surprise that the literature is weak in the area of bias
resistant analysis procedures. He goes on to note that bias can be a problem not only in
the elicitation of values but in the overall structure of a model. In a study of the oft-used
NASA process, Dennis (Dennis and Componation, 2004) cautions the reader on the
possibility of bias leading to a wrong choice. Dennis (2004 pg.17) is the only paper to
specifically warn against undue bias toward selection of a newer unstudied alternative,
Treat each alternative fairly, even if some are more developed than
others. A more developed option may appear to present more
potential development problems than a more glamorous new
option, but that doesn’t mean development problems won’t
eventually show up with the less developed alternative.
The more commonly stated belief is that there may exist a bias toward the status
quo, as described in Bostrom’s paper (Bostrom and Ord, 2006). Ullman (2006) expresses
the same common belief when he discusses uncertainty that can result from a lack of
knowledge about an alternative, and notes that a team’s experience with the same or
similar alternatives may influence the study. Componation (Componation and Nicholls,
2011) states that bias may even impact which MCDA method is selected for a study,
noting that experience with a particular method may lead to its continued use even if it is
not necessarily the best tool for a particular study. Regardless, the presence of
subjectivity and potential bias in an MCDA process is acknowledged.
Clearly, the problem with the presence of subjectivity, and therefore potential
bias, is that faulty scoring could be applied and/or options could be dropped prematurely,
resulting in selection of a sub-optimal alternative. Botten (2004) goes so far as to
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recommend that a study be concluded if it becomes obvious which alternative is superior.
The risk with this common mindset is, as Ewig (2006) explains, that in a case where
engineers seek a path with the highest long-term benefits, they may not readily be able to
envision the implementation of an otherwise attractive alternative and thus prematurely
remove the alternative from the study. In other words, Botten’s obvious appropriate
solution may not, in fact, be the correct solution and may be selected due to the lack of
expertise or other biases of the decision maker. Alternatively, as Dennis (2004) notes,
decisions may be contingent on the engineer’s frame of reference. Unal, (Unal et al,
2005) points out that the confidence of the individual may further influence the outcome.
Van Bossuyt (2009) considers the role of culture in affecting MCDA outcomes, stating
that culture of both end-users and design teams will continue to increase in importance
with respect to how they impact the decision making process. Kersten goes so far as to
question whether a good process necessarily leads to the best answer with or without bias
(Kersten and Noronha, 1997). The possibility of a sub-optimal decision coming from an
MCDA process is therefore generally acknowledged in the literature.
Given the acknowledgment of subjectivity and bias in MCDA, and the potential
for flawed outcomes due to that subjectivity and bias, some attempts have been made to
quantify or mitigate these effects. Unal proposes a system for calibrating the scoring of
experts based on their own level of confidence in their answers (Unal et al, 2005).
Jimenez (Jimenez, Rios-Insua, and Mateos, 2003) suggests combining the results of two
different mathematical scoring systems, essentially averaging a top-down and a bottomup version of scoring, to reduce problems with bias and inconsistencies in the elicitation
process. The Evidential Reasoning approach suggests an algorithm to combine the scores

16

of a significant number of raters (Xu and Yang, 2001). Ewig (2006) puts forth a method
of using idealized parameters to avoid introducing bias similar to TOPSIS. He also
suggests that an option may appear more attractive because it is better understood or is at
a higher level of technology development than other alternatives (Ewig, 2006), in contrast
to the effect that Dennis (2004) suggested better understanding of an option could have.
Tsoukias (Tsoukias, Perny, and Vincke, 2001) seeks to model preferences using ideas of
concordance and discordance based on Roy’s founding works. His colleague Ouerdane
(Ouerdane, Maudet, and Tsoukias, 2007) considers the potential benefits of an
argumentative approach to decision analysis, which would effectively create a consensus
score between a number of individuals for any criterion of any alternative, and thus wash
out overt bias. Jacobi (Jacobi and Hobbs, 2007) attempts to mitigate weighting biases in
value tree creation for certain MCDA processes, noting that some heuristics may induce
bias in a study. Kauffmann (Kauffmann et al, 2000) suggests a model for defining the
trade space for research investment options, and states that such a model reduces
subjective judgments. Morton (Morton and Fasolo, 2009) surveys research from the field
of Behavioral Decision Theory to apply to issues of bias in MCDA, and points to an
established aversion to losses that is stronger than a desire for gains. Smith (2006)
proposes applying concepts of cognitive biases from psychology and economics in his
paper on ameliorating mental mistakes, chiding an MCDA analyst who is overconfident,
but never characterizes or quantifies those biases. Vilkkumaa (2008) reviews a method
used in finance to select a subset of investment options, and touches on the problem of
overconfidence in what he refers to as personal upward bias. Wenstop (2004) even
suggests that subjectivity improves the formation of MCDA criteria and the ultimate
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outcome, a notion that is largely rejected by Le Menestrel (2005). Wenstop (2004 pg. 10)
states, “A major challenge for MCDA is therefore to work with the emotions of the
decision-maker to enhance well foundedness of values in order to approach what we
might aptly call emotional rationality.”
These authors all seek to avoid an impact from bias and subjectivity without
describing or quantifying that bias in any significant way. It is Schilling (Schilling, Oeser,
and Schaub, 2007), however, that proposes a method to assess the effectiveness of
decision analyses and whether group effects have an impact. He demonstrates an
assessment approach to determine whether the decision analysis was effective, in
multiple dimensions of effectiveness, and whether group alignment and commitment
level have a significant impact on the effectiveness of the analysis (Schilling, Oeser, and
Schaub, 2007). However, there is still little mention of the effects of subjectivity on bias,
and whether bias is typically for or against certain alternative types.
2.3 Decision Theory in Economics
2.3.1

Rational Choice and Expected Utility
Decision theory in economics and concepts of choice in psychology long predate

the particular field of MCDA. The years following World War II saw a tremendous
amount of research, including von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1947) foundational
work on game theory, which attempts to mathematically model strategic decision making
with multiple actors. Savage’s (1954) text on probability and expected utility set out
several axioms, appropriately referred to as the Savage Axioms, which govern aspects of
probability, preferences and expected utility. The Savage Axioms form a foundation of
expected utility and rely on rational actors seeking to maximize utility (Savage, 1954).

18

Texts on game theory describe the meaning of games and the expectations of rational
actors. Hackert’s (1974, pg. 292) finite mathematics chapter on game theory introduces it
with the statement,
In game theory, we consider situations in which there are two or
more persons, each of whose actions influence the outcome of a
single event. Each person tries to choose his course of action so
that, regardless of what his opponent does, the player can assure
himself of a certain gain.
He goes on to describe a player as someone who wants to win as much as possible
(Hackert, 1974). Simply put, the rational player maximizes utility. Hackert (1974)
concludes that game theory is inherently pessimistic and that a player chooses a course of
action that guarantees the most possible gain if another player is rational, and a greater
win if another player is not rational.
The consistent assumption is that all will act rationally. In his introductory game
theory text, Stahl (1991 pg. 122) establishes the principle of rationality with the
description, “Principle of Rationality: Every player wishes to come out as well off as
possible. In other words, cutting off one's nose in order to spite one's spouse is not
rational behavior, and such impulses will be given no consideration in this text.” He
would not bother to entertain the concept of a player acting irrationally for any reason. In
Rasmusen’s (2001) text, he introduces the player of a game as an individual who makes
decisions with the goal of maximizing utility. Eichberger’s (1993 pg. 1) text on game
theory in economics also sets the stage for rationality, stating,
Game theory studies the behavior of rational players in interaction
with other rational players. Players act in an environment where
other players' decisions influence their payoffs. Players are
considered to be rational if they maximize their objective functions
given their beliefs about the environment.
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Eichberger subtly introduces a caveat addressing the player’s beliefs about the
environment. The player acts rationally based upon what he knows or believes
(Eichberger, 1993). Thus, with imperfect information a player’s choice may not be
optimal, but that player is still rational based on the information provided. While game
theory does not typically apply to systems engineering and MCDA processes due to their
purpose of collectively choosing a single best option, the expectations of rationality seen
in game theory apply.
Other work in statistics and psychology also added to the field of decision theory,
with many continuing to model decision making and include nuances of human behavior
(Simon, 1955). Modelling uncertainty, and the nuances of uncertainty versus risk,
continued to be a popular theme in the field (Schlaifer, 1969), but all of the models rested
on certain assumptions of rationality (Fishburn, 1970). Decision theorists held to utility
theory, in which decision makers are rational actors and always seek to maximize the
expected utility, or outcome, in any decision process (Fishburn, 1970). Researchers in
many cases attempted to add subjective measures to expected utility or otherwise model
behaviors such as regret in decision making (Bell, 1982; Feldman, Miyamoto, and Loftus,
1999). Further statistical models (Linville, Hobbs, and Boddu, 2001) were also explored,
with some later attempting to compare more modern theories with classical rational
choices (Currim and Sarin, 1989). Surveys of economic theory included both expected
utility and modern adaptations by the 1990s (Kagel and Roth, 1995), while some authors
maintained that many subjective and behavioral nuances could not be modeled (Le
Menestrel, 2005). Kagel (Kagel and Roth, 1995) acknowledged framing effects, blamed
for many types of bias, and noted the importance of being able to reliably model the
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effects as a pressing question in the field. In contrast to Le Menestrel’s assertions, some
even countered that perceived biases addressed by newer theories could actually be
modeled rationally (Dupont and Lee, 2002).
2.3.2

Prospect Theory
One theory that had a very strong impact as an alternative to strict expected utility

was Prospect Theory, introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979). Kahneman won the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for his work in this
area (Nobel, 2002). Prospect Theory built upon earlier work by the pair, commissioned
by the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA), that showed uncertainty
or errors in decision making were not necessarily a result of incomplete information or of
confusion, but rather were often a result of bias and errors in judgment (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1977). In this prior research, they had determined that, “Errors of judgment are
often systematic rather than random, manifesting bias rather than confusion,” and, “There
are no significant differences between the judgmental processes of experts, intelligence
analysts, and physicians, to cite but a few, confirm the presence of common biases in the
professional judgments of experts” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1977 pg. i). Error and
suboptimal choices were the result of bias rather than mistakes, a concept that reached
back to psychological research from the 1960s and earlier (Lichtenstein, Slovic, and
Zink, 1969). In the introduction to the original paper on Prospect Theory, Kahneman
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 pg. 263) and Tversky state,
The present paper describes several classes of choice problems in
which preferences systematically violate the axioms of expected
utility theory. In the light of these observations we argue that
utility theory, as it is commonly interpreted and applied, is not an
adequate descriptive model and we propose an alternative account
of choice under risk.
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The paper goes on to note some effects that violate expected utility. The certainty
effect occurs when an individual decision maker over-weights a certain outcome and
underweights a probable outcome. The utility of the probable outcome as tested is greater
than the utility of the certain outcome, making the common choice of the certain outcome
irrational according to expected utility theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). This effect
is related to the idea of ambiguity aversion established by Ellsberg (1961). The reflection
effect in essence flips the signs of the certainty effect and refers to potential losses rather
than gains, and again violates expected utility (Kahnemen, 1979). The isolation effect
occurs when a choice is simplified by discounting similar shared components between the
choices. Such an approach may lead to inconsistencies in preferences because there is
more than one way to divide prospects into components and the differing decompositions
may lead to different preferences (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The most significant
effect in terms of the present review is the Endowment Effect, in which an individual
ascribes an unjustifiably high value to something they already own (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979).
In the Prospect Theory model of choice, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) also
demonstrated that decision makers have a stronger response to gains or losses from a
starting position or state than to final outcomes from an MCDA process. In other words,
individuals respond more strongly to a gain or loss than they do to differences in final
absolute numbers (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). They state, “An essential feature of
the present theory is that the carriers of value are changes in wealth or welfare, rather
than final states. This assumption is compatible with basic principles of perception and
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judgment” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 pg. 277). By way of examples, the paper
further states,
…an object at a given temperature may be experienced as hot or
cold to the touch depending on the temperature to which one has
adapted. The same principle applies to non-sensory attributes such
as health, prestige, and wealth. The same level of wealth, for
example, may imply abject poverty for one person and great riches
for another-depending on their current assets. (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979 pg. 277)
They and others worked to expand the theory to include many other elements
such as different weighting, loss aversion and risk aversion (Tversky and Shafir, 1992).
The pair demonstrates the presence of risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses
of high probability and risk seeking for gains and risk aversion for losses of low
probability (Tversky and Shafir, 1992). Other authors continued to perform broader
experiments in the social sciences concerning the effects described in Prospect Theory
(Camerer, 1998), and worked to produce expanded versions of the theory (Abdellaoui,
2000; Abdellaoui, Vossman, and Weber, 2005; Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv,
2007; and Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and L’Haridon, 2008).
2.3.3

Alternative Models of Choice
Other alternatives and augmentations to expected utility surfaced in more recent

research. Prior to his work on Prospect Theory, Tversky (1972) suggested the method of
eliminating alternatives based on certain aspects they did not exhibit, effectively selecting
based on negative criteria rather than positive attributes. Einhorn and Hogarth (1986)
exposed shortcomings in the bulk of research that assumed known probabilities of
occurrence and uncertainties, and presented a model to include ambiguity in decision
making, which they consider much more realistic in terms of real-world decisions with
imprecise uncertainties. Psychological research on theories of choice sought ways to
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consider psychological effects and errors in rational decision making models. In
particular, framing effects that alter an outcome based on the manner in which
alternatives are presented to an individual are discussed. (Zeckhauser, 1991). Others
attempted to include human intuition in MCDA processes, implementing decision aids
and tools early in a selection process prior to the actual choice of alternatives
(Wierzbicki, 1997).
More recently, Masatlioglu and Ok (2009) created a model that allows for a
starting point as described in Prospect Theory without being biased by the starting point,
hoping such would allow for existence of bias without the outcome being impacted by
that bias. Stefan’s (2009) dissertation suggested a unified model to merge differing
stakeholder viewpoints in an MCDA type process, with a particular focus on the nature of
innovative teams moving quickly to execute a design and making discoveries after the
planning phase of a design effort. He further noted that many of these innovative teams
tended to proceed despite the cautions of reviewers, indicating that management
reviewers of engineering design efforts tended to exhibit a status quo bias (Stefan, 2009).
2.4 Decision Theory Biases and Aversions
2.4.1

The Endowment Effect
One of the results that followed from Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect Theory

is a condition referred to as the Endowment Effect, in which an individual seems to
ascribe an unjustifiably high value to an item for no other reason than that they possess
the item (Thaler, 1980). Thaler (1980) based his work identifying the Endowment Effect
on Prospect Theory, noting some of the effects explicitly identified in the theory such as
gains and losses being considered differently, certain outcomes receiving more weight
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than uncertain outcomes, and problem structure impacting outcome. After describing the
value function from Prospect Theory, Thaler (1980 pg. 44) says the following to establish
the Endowment Effect:
This shape of the value function implies that if out-of-pocket costs
are viewed as losses and opportunity costs are viewed as foregone
gains, the former will be more heavily weighted: Furthermore, a
certain degree of inertia is introduced into the consumer choice
process since goods that are included in the individual's
endowment will be more highly valued than those not held in the
endowment, ceteris paribus. This follows because removing a good
from the endowment creates a loss while adding the same good (to
an endowment without it) generates a gain. Henceforth, I will refer
to the underweighting of opportunity costs as the endowment
effect.
An individual will be more impacted by the prospect of loss of an item they own
than by the prospect of a gain offered for the item (Thaler, 1980). Kahneman (Kahneman,
Knetsch, and Thaler, 1991 pg. 194) later describes this condition with the following
vignette:
A wine-loving economist we know purchased some nice Bordeaux
wines years ago at low prices. The wines have greatly appreciated
in value, so that a bottle that cost only $10 when purchased would
now fetch $200 at auction. This economist now drinks some of this
wine occasionally, but would neither be willing to sell the wine at
the auction price nor buy an additional bottle at that price.
He further performed an experiment to show that this effect happens even with
consumption goods, coffee mugs and similar items in the experiment, not only with items
of particular value or sentimentality (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1990). These
experiments demonstrated far less trading than the Coase Theorem, under which
bargaining in trade ultimately leads to efficient allocation of traded goods or services
despite the initial allocation, would have predicted, indicating people were unwilling to
trade the item they were given (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1990). Kahneman
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(Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1990) described this as an instantaneous Endowment
Effect, and demonstrated that the value assigned to any good appeared to increase
substantially as soon as the individual obtained the good. The idea of an instant
Endowment Effect went beyond prior research at the time, in which focus had been on
goods that had been in the individual’s possession for a significant length of time and
thus gained value (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1990).
Research on the Endowment Effect from a psychology standpoint also
demonstrated the effect and attempted to attribute it to an overly positive view of oneself,
in that an individual viewing themselves favorably might generalize that view to objects
in the individual’s possession (Beggan, 1992). Beggan (1992) referred to this as the Mere
Ownership Effect, and suggested that the owner of an object had a psychological link to
that object. With the object being an extension of the owner, it was subject to the same
general tendencies toward self-enhancing judgments (Beggan, 1992). Other researchers
showed that the Endowment Effect might diminish with real and significant gains, as
opposed to the sometimes trivial gains used for experimentation (Ortona and Scacciati,
1992). Van Dijk and Knippering (1998) named their own paper in a nod to the Kahneman
wine story, and concluded that the Endowment Effect is related to the comparability of
goods being traded, and this was a particular type of loss aversion. Some more recent
research shows that in some extreme cases positive and negative reactions can be
predicted (Inder and O’Brien, 2003), and that significant experience of an individual in a
particular market diminishes the impact of the Endowment Effect, as observed in two
distinct well-functioning markets (List, 2003). In explaining why people deviate from the
rational models when asked to make decisions, Thaler (1980 pg. 58-59) stated,
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What I have argued in this paper is that the orthodox economic
model of consumer behavior is, in essence, a model of robot-like
experts. As such, it does a poor job of predicting the behavior of
the average consumer. This is not because the average consumer is
dumb, but rather that he does not spend all of his time thinking
about how to make decisions.
2.4.2

Status Quo Bias
A particular bias considered to be a result of the Endowment Effect, which is a

key focus of this review, is the Status Quo Bias. The foundational paper that established
this bias experimentally demonstrated that individuals maintain a default, or status quo,
option even in the faces of alternatives that are objectively equal, and often with those
that are objectively superior (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). While earlier work
showed certain aspects of the bias as an extension of Kahneman and Tversky’s work on
loss aversion in the area of financial decisions (Shefrin and Statman, 1985), the
Samuelson and Zeckhauser paper specifically established the Status Quo Bias. They
introduced the idea stating,
Most real decisions, unlike those of economics texts, have a status
quo alternative-that is, doing nothing or maintaining one’s current
or previous decision. A series of decision making experiments
shows that individuals disproportionately stick with the status quo.
(Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988 pg. 7)
They describe the distinction between this and classic decision theory as follows:
A fundamental property of the rational choice model, under
certainty or uncertainty, is that only preference-relevant features of
the alternatives influence the individual’s decision. Thus, neither
the order in which the alternatives are presented nor any labels
they carry should affect the individual’s choice. Of course, in real
world decision problems the alternatives often come with
influential labels. Indeed, one alternative inevitably carries the
label status quo-that is, doing nothing or maintaining one’s current
or previous decision is almost always a possibility. (Samuelson and
Zeckhauser, 1988 pg. 8)
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Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) performed status quo experiments using
multiple versions of a questionnaire. In one version, the answer options were all
completely neutral. In the other versions, options were stated as a status quo option or
stated as an alternative to the status quo option. They compared how often an option was
chosen for each question based on whether it was neutral, status quo, or an alternative,
and found a statistically significant difference that indicated a bias toward a status quo
option. Another version of the experiment was performed in which participants were able
to self-select a status quo option and then had reason to change their answer in a second
round; the status quo bias was present in this case as well. Finally, Samuelson and
Zeckhauser (1988) studied real-world choices of insurance plans, and noted that in real
data concerning decisions of significant individual importance there remained a bias
toward the status quo.
A significant body of research has explored the status quo bias since then,
predominantly from an economic decision theory perspective. This includes a more
recent paper that modernized the original survey instrument and showed that
entrepreneurs as a specific group exhibit the bias to the same degree as students, but to a
lesser degree than bankers (Burmeister and Schade, 2007). Each question has three
possible choices, and the four survey versions include one completely neutral version and
three in which one of the three choices for each question is noted as the status quo
(Burmeister and Schade, 2007). A small number of other status quo bias surveys have
been developed for other studies since the original Samuelson and Zeckhauser survey.
One such survey polls utility customers (Hartman, Doane, and Woo, 1991). Hartman
(Hartman, Doane, and Woo, 1991) offered respondents six options for utility service
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based upon reliability, as measured by the number and duration of outages per year. The
respondents’ status quo, or current reliability level and current cost, was included among
the six options. Another survey reviewed healthcare choices and addressed a status quo
(Salkeld and Short, 2000). Salkeld (Salkeld and Short, 2000) asked respondents which
version of a colorectal cancer home test they would choose based on six parameters,
including accuracy and cost. The options were presented in four different scenarios to
study framing effects and status quo bias. These surveys relate to specific areas unrelated
to systems engineering, therefore, the Burmeister and Schade instrument was chosen as a
more general instrument for inclusion in the present research.
In other studies, Ritov and Baron attempted to show that the Status Quo Bias was
in fact due to omission bias (Ritov and Baron, 1992); however, Schweitzer showed in his
dissertation that the two existed independently (1993). He went on to demonstrate that it
exists within the context of other effects such as endowment and framing (Schweitzer,
1994; Schweitzer, 1995), stating, “The status quo bias operates within a context of
several phenomena that include framing, losses, regret, ambiguity, and endowment
effects (Schweitzer, 1994 pg. 472).” Schweitzer (1994) also noted an exaggerated
preference for inaction. Research in consumer behavior has shown Status Quo Bias in
consumer decision making, studied in the form of electric utility pricing (Hartman,
Doane, and Woo, 1991). Researchers in Information Technology have bemoaned a Status
Quo Bias in user reluctance to accept superior new systems, particularly if there exists a
belief that significant new training will be required (Kim and Kankanhalli, 2009; Polites
and Karahannaa, 2012). It has also been shown to exist in fields such as career
development, an area with clear individual significance in terms of outcomes (Hesketh,
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1996); public policy, showing that in particular disadvantaged groups prefer to maintain a
status quo even when that status quo is clearly and directly harmful to the individual or
group in question (Jost, Banaji, and Nosek, 2004); and ethics, where methods are desired
that would remove bias in ethical decisions (Bostrom and Ord, 2006). Much of the recent
research has tied Status Quo Bias to other conditions including decision avoidance
(Anderson, 2003), choice deferral (Buturak, 2011) and uncertainty aversion (Ortoleva,
2010). Other researchers show that issues such as choice complexity (Meyerhoff and
Liebe, 2009), number of alternatives (Kempf and Ruenzi, 2006), noncomplementarity
(Yaniv and Schul, 2000) and the manner in which information is formatted (Rubaltelli et
al, 2005) all tend to alter or enhance the degree of Status Quo Bias observed.
Kempf’s (Kempf and Ruenzi, 2006) study of real-world repeated decision
situations shows status quo bias in the selection of mutual funds, and empirically
demonstrates in the U.S. equity mutual fund market that status quo bias increases
significantly when the number of alternatives becomes larger. Rubaltelli (Rubaltelli et al,
2005) showed that formatting of financial information changed the outcome of a
decision, with stock returns stated as ratios increasing the appearance of status quo bias.
Further studies have shown that Status Quo Bias has more influence than ambiguity
aversion (Roca, Hogarth, and Maule, 2006) and that it is more readily demonstrated than
other biases (Brown and Kagel, 2009), while some attempt to include it in models of
rational choice (Masatlioglu and Ok, 2005). Brooks includes Status Quo Bias in her
broader work on management indecision (2011). Ortoleva (2009) acknowledges the
widespread existence of the status quo bias in the literature and describes an accepted
definition of the status quo as an object that exerts attraction toward itself.
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Psychological research continues to explore status quo bias as well, with one
recent study even demonstrating that torture is more likely to be deemed acceptable if a
participant is told it is a longstanding practice rather than a newly adopted practice
(Crandall et al, 2009). Psychology research also explores the idea that something is
deemed favorable simply because it already exists or because it has existed for some
significant length of time, with one study stating, “We show that the status quo also
beneﬁts from a simple assumption of goodness due to mere existence and longevity;
people treat existence as a prima facie case for goodness, aesthetic and ethical longevity
increases this preference” (Eidelman, 2012 pg. 270).
2.4.3

Ambiguity Aversion
Another focus of this review is Ambiguity Aversion. This concept was

demonstrated to violate Savage’s axioms of rational choice as it drives individuals away
from maximizing expected utility in the face of ambiguous or uncertain probabilities and
risks (Ellsberg, 1961). Ellsberg (1961 pg. 645) notes that even with the acceptance of
some uncertainties, actors are still considered rational, as he proposes, “A number of sets
of constraints on choice-behavior under uncertainty have now been proposed, all more or
less equivalent or closely similar in spirit, having the implication that - for a ‘rational’
man - all certainties can be reduced to risks.” He then sets out to show that these
uncertainties may not always be risks, and thus that there are situations in which the
Savage axioms do not hold, stating, “I propose to indicate a class of choice-situations in
which many otherwise reasonable people neither wish nor tend to conform to the Savage
postulates, nor to the other axiom sets that have been devised” (Ellsberg, 1961 pg. 646).
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Ellsberg works through some thought exercises to that end, and eventually describes his
experiments based on individuals making a single draw of a marble from one of two urns.
The basic experiment involves an urn in which there are known to be exactly 50
red marbles and exactly 50 black marbles, the unambiguous urn, and an urn in which
there between 0 and 100 red marbles and a complementary number of black marbles, the
ambiguous urn. He also describes other variants of the experiment using three colors of
marbles, one in known quantity and the others in uncertain distribution (Ellsberg, 1961).
He goes on to explain numerous choices in which, in one way or another, a wager
violates one of Savage’s axioms. He explains that there is an issue of the ambiguity of
provided information, which under some circumstances may affect an individual’s
confidence in estimating likelihoods of events (Ellsberg, 1961). Ellsberg (1961 pg. 660)
goes on to define what he would consider to be high ambiguity, stating,
Let us imagine a situation in which so many of the probability
judgments an individual can bring to bear upon a particular
problem are either 'vague' or 'unsure' that his confidence in a
particular assignment of probabilities, as opposed to some other of
a set of 'reasonable' distributions, is very low. We may define this
as a situation of high ambiguity.
He goes on to describe his concepts for dealing with ambiguity as a measure of
confidence in the amount of information a decision maker might have. Conservatism in
making a decision then drives the majority to overweight the undesirable outcome, losing
the bet in the urn experiment, and so favor the unambiguous bet. Ellsberg (1961) states
that the subject does not actually expect the worst possible outcome, but chooses to act as
if that outcome may be more likely than it is. In other words, the subjects tend to have an
aversion to the ambiguous option when given a choice. Ellsberg (1961) concludes by
stating that some information can be objectively classified as ambiguous, that such
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information may cause an individual to make choices in violation of the Savage axioms,
that such behavior is deliberate and difficult to reverse, and that certain patterns of
violation may be distinguished.
In circumstances involving high ambiguity, the individual routinely violates
Savage’s axioms and acts in a manner that could be considered irrational (Ellsberg,
1961). Although some early commenters on the original Ellsberg paper disagreed with
his conclusion (Roberts, 1963), Ellsberg (1963) contended that violations of the axioms
of rational choice were confirmed either way.
Much like follow-on research to the Status Quo Bias, later research examined
whether entrepreneurs as a group behave differently. It was determined that they exhibit
less ambiguity aversion than middle managers and executives in large organizations
(Schere, 1982). Researchers then began attempts to model ambiguity in decision making
processes, developing a model of consumer choice that held different outcomes for
ambiguity averse, indifferent and seeking individuals (Kahn and Sarin, 1988). Winkler
(1991) extended the prevailing idea of Ambiguity Aversion in perceived probabilities to
also include it in preferences of the decision maker. The concept of Ambiguity Aversion
met with the Endowment Effect in experiments that sought to determine whether
ambiguity altered the effect. It was determined that ambiguity had no significant impact
in that context (Eisenberger and Weber, 1995). The intersection of these ideas continued
as Tversky, one of the original authors on Prospect Theory and Endowment Effect, joined
research on the idea of comparative ignorance and ambiguity aversion. This research is
where comparative ignorance supposed that the source of the aversion was comparisons
with either less ambiguous events or more knowledgeable decision makers (Fox and
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Tversky, 1995; Fox and Weber, 2002). Keren (Keren and Gerritsen, 1999) had also
shown from a psychological perspective that the aversion held for both gains and losses
and across varying frames, and that the amount of information had a great impact on it.
Other research sought to study an ambiguity attitude that might increase or
decrease the Ambiguity Aversion in different types of individuals (Ghirardato, Marinacci,
and Maccheroni, 2004; Zhang, 2008). Ghirardato (Ghirardato and Marinacci, 2002)
attempted to describe an idea of absolute ambiguity, but ultimately concluded that it is
difficult to disentangle ambiguity aversion from general risk aversion. It was Roca,
Hogarth, and Maule (2006) that modified the original Ellsberg experiment to include a
status quo component, and attempted to show which had a greater impact, concluding
that Status Quo Bias appeared to be stronger than Ambiguity Aversion. Roca performed
three variants of the basic Ellsberg experiment in which one urn has exactly 50 red and
50 black marbles, and another urn has between 0 and 100 black marbles and a
complementary number of red marbles. In the primary form of his test, Roca, Hogarth,
and Maule (2006) provided some individuals with a ticket to play the ambiguous urn, and
would allow them to exchange the ticket to play the unambiguous urn if they so desired.
In other words, the ambiguous option was the status quo, which allowed determination of
which effect held greater sway. He concluded that, “This status quo bias emerged both
within- and between-subjects, with and without incentives, with different outcome
distributions, and with endowments determined by both the experimenter and the
participants themselves” (Roca, Hogarth, and Maule, 2006 pg. 175). Thus the population
tested preferred to maintain their status quo option more than they preferred to avoid the
ambiguous option.
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2.4.4

Inaction Inertia and Other Biases
A concept established in the literature and closely related to the Status Quo Bias is

called Inaction Inertia, which refers to the observed phenomenon in which individuals
that bypass an initial opportunity are far less likely to seize a subsequent opportunity
offered to them (Arkes, Kung, and Hutzel, 2002). It has also been experimentally shown
that inaction inertia was more evident in perceived subsequent gains than in perceived
subsequent losses, and that changing the source of such subsequent offers also changed
the evaluation of the subsequent offer, somewhat offsetting the Inaction Inertia effect
(Butler and Highhouse, 2000). Furthermore, the concept of regret has been shown in
consumer research to be greater in a switching decision than a status quo decision, unless
information is provided to show that the switching decision is well justified (Inman and
Zeelenberg, 2002).
A number of other related biases and aversions also present themselves in the
literature. One of the most common that is closely related to the Status Quo Bias is the
framing effect, in which predictable shifts in preference in a decision can be caused by
framing the problem in different ways (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). Kahneman
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1984) tied this to the Endowment Effect and the Status Quo
Bias, stating that the decision maker favors retaining the status quo because losses have a
greater impact than gains. Kahneman (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982) and
Tversky (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) also showed in other research that perceived
losses have a greater impact than perceived gains in these effects. Kahneman (1994) went
on to show that departures from rational choice often stemmed from faulty memories and
incorrect evaluation of past experience. Redelmeier (Redelmeier and Tversky, 1992),
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working with Tversky, further showed that decisions changed whether framed
independently or in aggregate. Johnson (Johnson et al, 1993) correlated experimental data
to actual purchase data to demonstrate that framing manipulation caused violations of
rationality, while Kuhberger’s (Kuhberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, and Perner, 1999)
analysis of studies in this area concluded that most variance in choices and preferences is
due to framing, rather than any other factor. Another experimenter, however, showed that
in some instances preference reversal could be demonstrated independently of framing,
stating that analysts should be aware of inconsistencies in assessing preferences and
trade-offs (Delquie, 1993).
Other common scenarios that arise from framing and the Status Quo Bias are
preference for a non-choice and preference to defer choice (Dhar, 1996; Dhar, 1997).
Conflict is shown to have a significant impact on the desire to defer choice, with higher
conflict resulting in higher preference to defer (Tversky and Shafir, 1992a; Weber,
Baron, and Loomes, 2001). Further corollary concepts show that perceived competence
plays a role in these biases and aversions (Heath and Tversky, 1991), as well as the way
the risks of choices are communicated (Stone, Yates, and Parker, 1994) and whether a
decision maker is forced to use a certain decision strategy or is allowed to determine
themselves which strategy to use (Zakay and Tsal, 1993). Furthermore, the magnitude of
perceived or actual losses from a choice may affect attribute weighting (Etchart-Vincent,
2004), along with whether the decision is considered to be a choice among alternatives or
a rejection of certain alternatives (Shafir, 1993). In relation to these are the apparent
aversion to alternatives that are considered extreme (Simonson and Tversky, 1992).
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Ultimately, many authors have sought to create rules and algorithms that would minimize
biases while yielding the optimal outcome (Keeney, 1992; Quiggin, 1989).
2.5 Summary
In summary, MCDA processes are commonly used in systems engineering and
are widely understood to be subject to potential error and bias. “Bias (e.g., differences in
viewpoint, conflicts of interest, prior sales efforts) must be perceived and resolved,”
according to Botten (2004 pg. 3) In the fields of economics and psychology, biases and
aversions have been widely studied and demonstrated in economic and consumer
decisions. Status Quo Bias and Ambiguity Aversion, along with many corollary biases,
aversions and effects, are well known for their impacts on decision making and the
manner in which they drive individuals away from accepted rules of rational choice. They
have been studied in a variety of contexts and arenas, and on general populations as well
as the specific group called entrepreneurs. However, they have never been studied in
relation to the specific group of engineers. It is principally systems engineers that perform
MCDA processes and make decisions in the technical world, yet it has not be shown
whether they exhibit the Status Quo Bias and Ambiguity Aversion to the same degree, if
at all, as the general population. Almost all of the literature assumes they exhibit bias in
the same way as the general population; only Dennis (2004) suggests a predisposition
toward an exciting less-developed new alternative. Given the magnitude of many
decisions resulting from these processes, it is thus desirable to understand whether
engineers are subject to these biases and aversions.
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CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

3.1 Introduction
The purposes of this section are to define the research questions and to present a
specific set of testable hypotheses to address the research questions.
3.2 Research Questions
The objective of MCDA and decision theory research has been to improve
decision making and aid decision makers in consistently striving for an optimal solution.
The fields of decision theory and MCDA have advanced significantly in the last 35 years,
including numerous new methods, algorithms and theories of choice. The literature
review has shown that a great deal of research has been conducted on the topic of bias in
decision making processes. The research has covered a number of biases, proposed both
solutions to overcome bias and theories that include bias, and studied biases in general
populations and a small number of business-related subgroups. The related status quo
bias and ambiguity aversion have been studied; however, they have not been studied
specifically concerning systems engineers.
The literature has left open a few closely related questions that form the basis for
the research presented here. There are two primary questions. First, do engineers exhibit
the status quo bias in the same manner as the general population? Second, do engineers
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exhibit ambiguity aversion, and, if so, is it stronger or weaker for them than status quo
bias? Certain secondary questions may be further explored dependent on the data
collected. Do engineering managers exhibit these potential biases in the same manner as
working-level engineers? Does the engineer’s work environment affect the manner in
which these biases are exhibited? Do any other demographic factors impact these
potential biases in engineers? Finally, is there an indication that the status quo bias (if
present) manifests differently for engineers considering design problems than for
engineers considering financial problems?
3.3 Primary Research Hypotheses
The purpose of this study is to determine whether engineers are subject to the
stated biases to a greater, lesser, or the same degree as the general population. Three
primary research hypotheses address this purpose.
•

Hypothesis 1 (H1): Engineers exhibit the Status Quo Bias.
For the purposes of this research, the stated hypothesis is that engineers behave in

largely the same manner as the general population.
•

Hypothesis 2 (H2): Engineers exhibit Ambiguity Aversion.
As with status quo bias, the assumption will be that engineers do not differ from

other studied groups.
•

Hypothesis 3 (H3): Engineers react more strongly to Status Quo Bias than
Ambiguity Aversion.
Again, the general population was shown to be more susceptible to status quo bias

than ambiguity aversion, so the hypothesis reflects an assumption that engineers will do
the same. Confirmation of these hypotheses would provide value in supporting the
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general assumption in MCDA literature that these biases are the same in engineers as
they are in other arenas. Rejection of these hypotheses would be cause for serious
reconsideration of commonly accepted assumptions on the nature of biases in engineering
trade studies and related decision making processes.
3.4 Secondary Research Hypotheses
A number of secondary objectives may be satisfied in this study given the
collection of the appropriate data to support such analysis. First, it is of interest whether
engineers holding a management or supervisory position, with other engineers as direct
reports, exhibit the stated biases in the same manner as working-level engineers. A
difference in decision making with supervisory experience would indicate a need to study
other possible cognitive changes that may also be incumbent with management
responsibility. It is assumed that there is no such difference between managers and
workers.
•

Hypothesis 4 (H4): Engineering managers exhibit the same level of Status Quo
Bias and Ambiguity Aversion as working-level engineers.
It would be of further interest if general demographic factors such as gender,

ethnicity, age or experience level impact the level of bias. It is assumed that they do not.
•

Hypothesis 5 (H5): Other demographic factors do not impact the level of Status
Quo Bias.
A further secondary objective is to determine whether the work environment of an

engineer impacts any bias. In particular, the difference between a predominantly working
group environment versus predominantly team environment is explored, with an
assumption that there is no difference.
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•

Hypothesis 6 (H6): Work environment does not impact level of Status Quo Bias.
Finally, there is some question as to whether engineers might respond differently

to typical economic situations than they would to engineering design situations. Thus
another secondary objective is to test for an indication that these scenarios might differ.
The assumption is that they do not.
•

Hypothesis 7 (H7): There is no difference in status quo bias for engineers
between financial decisions and design decisions.
These hypotheses are addressed to the degree possible with the available data.

3.5 Summary
In conclusion, this research seeks to determine whether and to what degree
engineers exhibit the status quo bias and ambiguity aversion and whether certain
demographic factors may further impact these effects. This chapter presents the primary
and secondary questions elicited from the literature review, and the hypotheses tested in
exploring these questions.
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CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction
The focus of this dissertation was to determine whether or not and to what extent
engineers exhibit status quo bias and ambiguity aversion. The methods supporting this
study involved four phases. The first phase was an extensive literature review, presented
in Chapter 2 of this document. A thorough review revealed there were no prior studies
that investigated these two effects specifically in relation to engineers performing trade
studies, or MCDA processes. Unrelated research has demonstrated that engineers behave
differently than the general population in areas such as formation of teams (Benfield,
2005). Thus the need exists to determine whether engineers differ from the general
population and other previously studied sub-groups when it comes to bias in decision
making. The second phase of this research effort was to identify and develop instruments
to study ambiguity aversion and status quo bias, as well as gather certain demographic
information. The instrument used is discussed in further detail in this chapter. The third
phase was to conduct a pilot study. The purpose of this phase was to collect a sample of
at least 30 responses and assess whether there is any indication of an unexpected issue
with the instrument used. This data was collected via an online data collection tool. A
further purpose of the pilot study was to provide a preliminary indication of what may be
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learned from the full study and which demographic factors may be of particular interest.
The final phase was the primary study, including collection of sufficient responses and a
complete analysis of the results of each portion of the research instrument. The desired
minimum number of responses of the primary study was 120. This number was based on
the accepted minimum frequency count for an r x c contingency table, which is at least a
value of five in each cell (Montgomery and Runger, 2011).
4.2 Data Collection Method and Population
Data for both the pilot study and primary study were collected from survey
instruments via an online data collection tool. Data for the pilot study was collected from
engineering graduate students at The University of Alabama in Huntsville. The data for
the primary study was collected primarily from a large U.S. DoD research and
development agency and its contractors. Approximately 1,000 individuals within the
agency were contacted, and invited to participate. More than 100 responded by
completing the survey instrument. While the focus of the research is engineers, data was
collected from numerous non-engineers in order to provide a comparison to the
engineering data. Data was further collected from select non-government sources in a
variety of geographic locations around the U.S., including companies in the
telecommunications, aeronautics, automotive, and construction fields. These samples
were from personal contacts which were a sample of convenience. Miller (2006) showed
that a sample of convenience is still valid when using an established research
methodology and instrument.
The questionnaire administered included a number of demographic factors. The
gender and race of respondents were useful for comparison to the general engineering
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population, that would be likely to take part in an engineering trade study or MCDA
process. Table 4.1 compares the demographic data from the present research to
engineering demographic data for a sample of practicing engineers from two sources: 1)
the NSF (2013) and 2) a recent engineering graduate demographic profile from the
American Society for Engineering Education (ASEE) (Yoder, 2011). The demographics
for this study compare favorably with the other sources. Two proportion tests showed that
the gender of respondents in this study did not differ from either of the two demographic
data sources at the 5% significance level. The most notable difference in racial data was
that Asian respondents were underrepresented in this study, and so the proportion tests
showed the white and Asian groups differed significantly from each of the other sources.
It is also noteworthy that the NSF and ASEE data differed significantly from each other
for the white and Asian groups. The proportion of respondents in the other racial or
ethnic categories for this study were not significantly different when compared to at least
one of the other sources for every other racial or ethnic category. It should also be noted
that a significant percentage of the student respondents self-identified as “other” for race
compared to other sources. Overall, the comparison showed that the respondents in this
study were a reasonable representation of the population of engineers in the U.S.
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Table 4.1: Demographic Comparison
Data Source
% Male
% Female
% White
% Asian
% Black
% Hispanic
% Native American
% Other
% Multi-racial

Present Research
80.9
19.1
84.9
3.2
4.8
3.2
0.8
1.6
1.6

NSF Data
87.2
12.7
71.6
16.7
3.6
6.3
0.3
0.3
1.2

ASEE Data
81.6
18.4
62.1
11.4
3.9
7.9
0.4
6.4
1.0

4.3 Research Instrument
The survey instrument employed in this research contained nine questions, in
addition to basic demographic information. Four versions of the survey were used to
allow for between-group testing of the status quo bias component. Each individual
received only one version of the survey. The complete set of survey questions can be seen
in Appendix A.
The first survey question tested for ambiguity aversion. There were two versions
of the question, each appearing in two of the four survey versions. The version appearing
in Survey A and Survey C presented the basic Ellsberg (1961) urn experiment, asking
whether respondents would prefer to gamble on an urn with an unambiguous probability
of winning or an urn with an equal but ambiguous probability of winning. The version
appearing in Survey B and Survey D presented the Roca (Roca, Hogarth, and Maule,
2006) update to the Ellsberg experiment, which included a status quo component.
Respondents were told they had a ticket to play the ambiguous urn, and had the
opportunity to either retain that ticket or exchange it for a ticket to play the unambiguous
urn.
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Questions two through seven of the survey were the status quo bias instrument
developed by Burmeister and Schade (2007). Each of the six questions presented a
scenario with three possible options from which to choose. Four versions of the
instrument were incorporated, as in the original study. Survey A contained neutral
versions of the scenarios, in which no status quo was established. Surveys B, C, and D
contained versions of the instrument in which each of the three options taook a turn as the
status quo option, and consequently had two turns as an alternative to the status quo
option. A status quo option was established by adding a phrase to the scenario that
indicated such an option was adopted in the past. Minor modifications were made to
these questions to translate them from the original European audience to a North
American audience.
Question eight was developed by the author and was similar in construction to the
previous six status quo questions. This question was added to indicate whether an
engineering design question might elicit more or less of a status quo bias than the
financial or business related questions seen in the existing instrument. MCDA as used in
systems engineering often includes alternatives with technical design differences as a
focus, which may cause a somewhat different reaction than the more business oriented
choices. The question further used two tested and well-understood options, with the third
option as an exciting but mostly untested choice. This array of options was chosen based
on the author’s personal experience with Aerospace engineers appearing to favor a new
alternative. This option was further indicated as a possibility by Dennis and Componation
(2004). While this single question cannot establish a difference in status quo bias, it can
indicate whether future work should explore these issues.
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The final survey question was provided by Reitmeier’s (2013) work to indicate
whether status quo bias might vary based upon the primary work environment of the
respondent. The question explained the difference between working group and team
environments, then asked the respondents to rate their primary work environment on a
seven-point Likert scale ranging from strong working group environment to strong team
environment. This is essentially a demographic question, but it was presented in the main
survey due to the lengthy explanation required in presenting the question.
The surveys also collected basic demographic information including age,
race/ethnicity, gender, highest level of educational attainment, current occupation, years
of experience in that occupation, and whether that experience had predominantly been in
government or private industry. The demographic questionnaire asked whether the
respondent had an engineering degree in order to categorize engineers and non-engineers
in the analysis. Finally, the questionnaire asked whether the respondent currently
managed engineers or had in the past. This information was the basis for comparing
engineering managers to working-level engineers.
4.4 Pilot Study
The pilot study was conducted using responses from 33 graduate students in
systems engineering at The University of Alabama in Huntsville. The demographics of
these students were similar to those of the complete study. The pilot study was performed
to check for any abnormalities that would indicate a need to adjust the instrument or
collection system. The results of the pilot study indicated a strong ambiguity aversion
amongst engineers and very weak status quo bias amongst engineers. The engineering
design question indicated a need for future research in the area of status quo bias in
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technical trade studies. Demographic factors were not found to exhibit significant
differences.
4.5 Analysis Steps
This study employed a number of common statistical techniques to test the
primary and secondary hypotheses. These included the χ2 test for independence, two
proportion test, discriminant analysis, and Multivariate Analysis of Variance
(MANOVA). The steps to be performed on the data gathered are presented in general
terms in this section and summarized in Table B.1 in Appendix B. Analysis was
performed in Microsoft Excel and Minitab 16 and described in detail in Chapter 5 of this
document.
4.5.1

Ambiguity Aversion
Ambiguity aversion was first tested using the results of the basic Ellsberg (1961)

version of the ambiguity experiment that appeared in survey versions A and C. The
proportion of individuals choosing the unambiguous option to those choosing the
ambiguous option were compared to a hypothetical 50/50 split. A significant difference
in the proportion from 50/50 would indicate ambiguity aversion or ambiguity seeking.
This was checked separately for engineers and non-engineers.
After establishing the basic premise of ambiguity aversion, the proportion of
respondents choosing the unambiguous urn was compared between the original version
of the experiment and the Roca, Hogarth, and Maule (2006) update that included a status
quo component. If the proportion did not change significantly, it would indicate that
ambiguity aversion was not overcome by status quo bias. If the proportion did change
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significantly between the two versions of the experiment, it would indicate that status quo
bias was stronger than ambiguity aversion.
Tests were then performed comparing engineers to non-engineers for each version
of the experiment. If the proportions choosing the unambiguous option were the same
amongst engineers and non-engineers, it would indicate that there was no significant
difference in ambiguity resided aversion with engineers.
4.5.2

Status Quo Bias
Testing for the status quo bias began by testing how often a particular option was

chosen in each version of the survey for each question. If an option was chosen as often
whether it was neutral, the status quo, or an alternative to the status quo, then that
question would not indicate the existence of a status quo bias. This was tested for both
engineers and non-engineers, with an eye toward how many questions indicated status
quo bias for each group.
After the initial test, a set of tests of the proportions of respondents choosing an
option when it was status quo versus neutral and status quo versus alternative to the status
quo were performed. This was similar to the type of testing performed in prior work with
this survey instrument (Burmeister and Schade, 2007). This yielded six tests for every
question. If the proportions of the choices were the same, it would indicate that there was
no status quo bias. A number of proportions being significantly different would indicate
the existence of a status quo bias.
Following the two forms of testing to establish whether a status quo bias was
evident, data was tested to determine whether the answers could be used to tell whether a
respondent was an engineer or non-engineer. If the answers could be used to determine
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whether the respondent was an engineer, with significantly better accuracy than simply
guessing, it would indicate a significant difference in the status quo bias between
engineers and non-engineers.
A similar test was performed with the engineering group to see if it was possible
to determine which version of the survey a respondent completed based only on the
answers. If it was possible to tell with significant accuracy the survey from which the
responses came, this would indicate a difference between the way different versions were
answered, further confirming the existence of a status quo bias.
The tests of proportions choosing the various options to answer each question
were also performed on the design-related status quo bias question. If the proportions
differed significantly, it would indicate a status quo bias or a bias toward the alternative
for this type of question as well.
4.5.3

Demographic Factors
A secondary objective of this study was to determine whether engineering

managers make decisions differently than working-level engineers. To test this the
engineer samples were further broken down into those who currently managed or had
previously managed engineers, and those who had not. These groups were first tested for
differences in the way they exhibited ambiguity aversion in the same manner as engineers
and non-engineers were tested for the primary objective of this study. If the proportions
of engineering managers and working-level engineers choosing the unambiguous option
differed significantly, this would indicate engineering managers did exhibit ambiguity
aversion differently. For the status quo bias questions, the answers would again be used
to attempt to determine whether or not a respondent was a manager. If this could be
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determined with significant accuracy, it would indicate that engineering managers
exhibited status quo bias to a different degree than working-level engineers.
Another secondary objective of this study was to test whether engineers’ primary
work environments had an impact on the degree to which they exhibited ambiguity
aversion or status quo bias. Individuals were asked to indicate on a seven-point Likert
scale where they felt their primary work environment fell on a spectrum from strong team
to strong working group. These were condensed to three groups: team, neutral or
confounded, and working group. Differences between these were tested in much the same
way as differences between engineering managers and non-managers. If the different
groups chose the unambiguous option in the ambiguity aversion experiment in different
proportions, it would indicate that work environment had an impact on ambiguity
aversion. If the answers to the status quo bias questions could be used to accurately
determine the work environment of the respondent, it would indicate that work
environment had an impact on status quo bias.
After the primary and secondary objectives were considered, each of the basic
demographics collected were tested for differences in the way that they exhibited or
failed to exhibit the status quo bias. Testing was performed for government versus nongovernment status, highest educational attainment, gender, race, age and years of
experience within the engineer sample in the same manner as that described for
managerial status and work environment. The divisions based on each demographic could
be combined into two or three subgroups depending on the samples collected.
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4.6 Summary
This research was accomplished in four phases: literature review, instrument
selection, pilot study and primary study. This study tested the hypotheses outlined in
Chapter 3 of this document using a set of four versions of a survey instrument that
explored ambiguity aversion and status quo bias. Analysis was performed using a
combination of χ2 test for independence, proportion tests, discriminant analysis, and
MANOVA.
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CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA

The purpose of this chapter is to present and discuss the data analysis of the study.
The overall questions to be answered with the analysis are whether engineers exhibit
status quo bias and ambiguity aversion to a greater, lesser, or similar degree as the
general population, and whether factors such as managerial status, work environment and
basic demographic factors impact the degree of status quo bias and ambiguity aversion.
5.1 Demographics
The four versions of the survey instrument were distributed as described in
Chapter 4 of this document. A total of 250 complete surveys were analyzed after
discarding incomplete entries. Of these, 126 self-identified as having an engineering
degree, and were categorized as the engineer sample. A total of 124 respondents
identified themselves as not having an engineering degree, and were categorized as the
non-engineer or general sample. Of the non-engineer sample, ten reported working as
engineers; however, they were still counted in the non-engineer or general sample. This
sample also reported 14 working in science, 46 in business, five in the arts, and 49 in
other occupations. Thus the non-engineer group represents a cross-section of occupations.
All other demographic groups will be reported for the engineer sample only, as the
demographics of that sample were the main concern for this study. All demographic
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identification was self-reported by the respondent. No identifying information about the
individual was retained and all surveys were completely anonymous.
For the engineer group, the highest level of educational attainment was broken
down into only two categories, given that engineers were identifying themselves as
having an engineering degree. The two categories were bachelor’s degree and master’s
degree or higher. Respondents with only a bachelor’s degree accounted for 45.2% of the
engineering responses, while those with a master’s degree or higher accounted for 54.8%
of the engineering responses. The breakdown of responses can be seen in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1: Highest Educational Attainment of the Engineer Sample
Highest Education
Bachelors
Masters or Higher

Number of
Responses
57
69

Percent of Responses
45.2%
54.8%

Years of experience in the respondent’s current occupation was broken into five
categories: 0-5 years, 6-10 years, 11-15 years, 16-20 years and 20+ years. The
respondents were spread somewhat evenly throughout these experience categories. The
0-5 year category accounted for 26.2% of responses, the 6-10 year category accounted for
15.1%, the 11-15 year category accounted for 22.2%, the 16-20 year category accounted
for 7.9%, and the 20+ years of experience category had the largest number with 28.6% of
responses. The breakdown of respondents in these categories can be seen in Table 5.2.
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Table 5.2: Years of Experience of the Engineer Sample
Years of
Experience
0-5
6-10
11-15
16-20
20+

Number of
Responses
33
19
28
10
36

Percent of Responses
26.2%
15.1%
22.2%
7.9%
28.6%

A factor of particular interest was whether the respondent worked for the
government or a firm in private industry. For the purposes of analysis, only government
civilians were considered government, while those identifying as government contractor,
private industry, self-employed or other were collectively considered non-government.
Employees of the U.S. federal government accounted for 45.2% of respondents, while
non-government employees accounted for 54.8% of respondents. The breakdown of
government versus non-government can be seen in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3: Government Status of the Engineer Sample
Government
Status
Government
Non-Government

Number of
Responses
57
69

Percent of
Responses
45.2%
54.8%

The gender of respondents in the engineer sample can be seen in Table 5.4. A
significant number of female engineers responded; however, the breakdown was still
male-dominated, as expected. Females accounted for 19% of respondents and males for
81% of respondents, which was comparable to the gender breakdown for engineers
shown in Chapter 4.
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Table 5.4: Gender of the Engineer Sample
Number of
Responses
24
102

Gender
Female
Male

Percent of Responses
19.0%
81.0%

Demographic information on race/ethnicity was collected covering several racial
categories. The racial categories collected were the same as those used by the U.S.
Census Bureau in the 2010 census. White respondents accounted for 84.9% of the total,
with minority respondents accounting for the remaining 15.1%. The breakdown of race in
the engineer sample can be seen in Table 5.5. The breakdown of gender and race in this
study compared favorably to that of engineers throughout the U.S., as shown previously
in Table 4.1.

Table 5.5: Race of the Engineer Sample
Race
White
Asian
Black
Hispanic
Native American
Other
Multi-Racial

Number of
Responses
107
4
6
4
1
2
2

Percent of Responses
84.9%
3.2%
4.8%
3.2%
0.8%
1.6%
1.6%

Age of the engineering sample was divided into three categories: Under 30, 30-49
and 50+. The 30-49 age group was the largest, accounting for 48.4% of respondents. The
under 30 age group accounted for 26.2% of respondents, while the 50+ age group
accounted for 25.4% of respondents. The breakdown of ages of the engineer sample can
be seen in Table 5.6.
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Table 5.6: Age of the Engineer Sample
Age Group
Under 30
30-49
50+

Number of
Responses
33
61
32

Percent of Responses
26.2%
48.4%
25.4%

5.2 Ambiguity Aversion Analysis
The first step in the analysis plan for the study laid out in Chapter 4 of this
document was to test for the presence and degree of ambiguity aversion in both engineers
and the general population, and whether ambiguity aversion changed in the face of a
status quo component to the experiment.
The ambiguity aversion analysis began with a simple proportion test comparing
the proportion of respondents choosing the unambiguous option to a hypothetical
proportion of 0.5. This was first performed using only the basic ambiguity question
presented in surveys A and C, without including the question presented in surveys B and
D, which included a status quo component. The hypothetical proportion of 0.5
represented the expected outcome based on the probabilities of each choice in the
question being identical. In other words, the probability of drawing the desired color
marble from either urn in question was the same, so the number of respondents choosing
each should then also be the same, meaning a proportion of 0.5 would choose the
unambiguous urn. If a significantly greater proportion of respondents than 0.5 chose the
unambiguous urn, this would indicate ambiguity aversion. Conversely, if a significantly
smaller proportion of respondents than 0.5 chose the unambiguous urn, this would
indicate ambiguity seeking. Not surprisingly, both engineers and non-engineers chose the
unambiguous option significantly more than half the time. This matched results from the
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earlier study (Ellsberg, 1961). Amongst engineers, a proportion of 0.862 chose the
unambiguous urn. Amongst non-engineers, a proportion of 0.697 chose the unambiguous
urn. The results are shown in Table 5.7. The proportion of both groups choosing the
unambiguous option was significantly different from 0.5 at the 1% significance level,
with the engineer sample differing a noticeably greater amount than the non-engineer
sample. This significant difference from the hypothetical 0.5 proportion showed strong
evidence for the presence of ambiguity aversion, which reflected prior research (Ellsberg,
1961; Roca, Hogarth, and Maule, 2006).

Table 5.7: Ambiguity Aversion Proportion Test

Group
Engineers
Non-Engineers

X (Number N (Total
choosing
Number
Sample
unambiguous
of
Proportion
urn)
samples)
50
58
0.862
46
66
0.697

P-Value
< 0.001
0.002

After establishing the presence of ambiguity aversion in both engineers and nonengineers, the next step was to test whether the basic ambiguity experiment results
differed from the ambiguity aversion experiment with a status quo component for each
group. If the results between the two versions of the ambiguity aversion question were
significantly different, this would indicate that status quo bias had a greater impact on the
group than ambiguity aversion.
This was tested in two ways, beginning with a χ2 test for independence for each
group. In effect, the results were grouped in a 2 x 2 contingency table, with the
unambiguous and ambiguous option as columns and the two versions of the question as
rows. The null hypothesis for this type of test was that the rows of the table are
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independent. In this case, independent rows would mean the version of the question did
not significantly impact the selection of the unambiguous or ambiguous option, which in
turn would mean that the status quo component did not significantly impact the choices
of the respondents. The results for engineers can be seen in Table 5.8. The results for
non-engineers can be seen in Table 5.9. In both groups, the null hypothesis was rejected,
meaning the frequency of selection of each option was dependent on which version of the
question was presented. In other words, the frequency of selections of the unambiguous
and ambiguous options differed significantly when the status quo component was added.
This indicated that the status quo bias existed and had a greater impact on the respondent
than ambiguity aversion. The difference for both engineers and non-engineers was
significant at the 1% level. It was noted that although the engineer sample saw a greater
change in proportion due to the high level of ambiguity aversion in the basic experiment,
the proportion staying with the unambiguous option despite the status quo was greater for
the engineer sample.

Table 5.8: χ2 test for Ambiguity Aversion, Engineers
Unambiguous Ambiguous
1 (No
Status
Quo)
2
(Status
Quo)
Total

Total

50

8

58

32

36

68

82

44

126

χ2 = 21.109 DF = 1 P-Value < 0.001
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Table 5.9: χ2 test for Ambiguity Aversion, Non-engineers
Unambiguous Ambiguous
1 (No
Status
Quo)
2
(Status
Quo)
Total

Total

46

20

66

23

35

58

69

55

124

χ2 = 11.288 DF = 1 P-Value = 0.001

The second way the difference between the basic and status quo versions of the
ambiguity aversion experiment was tested was using a two proportion test to compare the
proportion picking the unambiguous option between the two versions of the question for
both engineers and non-engineers. If the proportion choosing the unambiguous urn was
significantly different between the two versions of the question, with fewer choosing the
unambiguous urn when the ambiguous urn was defined as a status quo, this would again
indicate a status quo bias that was stronger than ambiguity aversion. The results for
engineers can be seen in Table 5.10. The results for non-engineers can be seen in Table
5.11. As expected, these results confirmed the χ2 test for independence results and
showed that there was a significant difference between the proportion of respondents
choosing the unambiguous option in the two versions of the experiment for both
engineers and non-engineers. In other words, the two proportion test showed that
significantly fewer respondents chose the unambiguous urn when the ambiguous urn was
defined as a status quo. This confirmed the indication that the status quo component had a
greater impact on respondents than ambiguity aversion for both engineers and nonengineers.
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Table 5.10: Two Proportion Ambiguity Aversion Test, Engineers
Sample
X (Number N (Total
proportion
choosing
number
Sample
choosing
unambiguous
of
unambiguous
urn)
samples)
urn
1 (No
Status
50
58
0.862
Quo)
2
(Status
32
68
0.471
Quo)
Z = 5.18 P-Value < 0.001
Fisher's Exact Test P-Value < 0.001

Table 5.11: Two Proportion Ambiguity Aversion Test, Non-engineers
Sample
X (Number N (Total
proportion
choosing
number
Sample
choosing
unambiguous
of
unambiguous
urn)
samples)
urn
1 (No
Status
46
66
0.697
Quo)
2
(Status
23
58
0.397
Quo)
Z = 3.51 P-Value < 0.001
Fisher's Exact Test P-Value = 0.001

The final step in the ambiguity aversion portion of the analysis was to compare
engineers and non-engineers using a two proportion test. The proportion of engineers
choosing the unambiguous option was compared to the proportion of non-engineers
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choosing the unambiguous option for both the basic experiment and the alternate
experiment with the status quo component. If the proportion choosing the unambiguous
urn was significantly different between engineers and non-engineers, it would indicate
that engineers and non-engineers exhibited ambiguity aversion to differing degrees.
The results for the basic experiment can be seen in Table 5.12. Row 1 is the
proportion of engineers choosing the unambiguous option and row 2 is the proportion of
non-engineers choosing the unambiguous option. The proportion of engineers choosing
the unambiguous option in the basic experiment was 0.862, while the proportion of nonengineers choosing the unambiguous option was 0.697. The proportions were different at
the 5% significance level, indicating that engineers exhibited stronger ambiguity aversion
than non-engineers.
The results for the version of the experiment with a status quo component can be
seen in Table 5.13. Again, Row 1 is the engineer population and row 2 is the nonengineer population. The proportion of engineers choosing the unambiguous option
despite the ambiguous option being defined as a status quo was 0.471. The proportion of
non-engineers choosing the unambiguous option despite the ambiguous option being
defined as a status quo was 0.397. In this case, although the proportion of engineers
choosing the unambiguous option was greater, the difference was not statistically
significant. It was again notable that the engineer population had a larger proportion
choosing the unambiguous option despite the status quo component added to the
modified version of the experiment. This could indicate a slightly weaker status quo bias
in engineers than in non-engineers.
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Table 5.12: Two Proportion Ambiguity Aversion Test Comparing Engineers to Nonengineers for Basic Ambiguity Experiment
Sample
X (Number N (Total
proportion
choosing
number
choosing
unambiguous
of
unambiguous
urn)
samples)
urn

Sample

1
(Engineers,
No Status
Quo)
2 (NonEngineers,
No Status
Quo)

50

58

0.862

46

66

0.697

Z = 2.28 P-Value = 0.023
Fisher's Exact Test P-Value = 0.033

Table 5.13: Two Proportion Ambiguity Aversion Test Comparing Engineers to Nonengineers for Modified Ambiguity Experiment
Sample
X (Number N (Total
proportion
choosing
number
choosing
unambiguous
of
unambiguous
urn)
samples)
urn

Sample

1
(Engineers,
Status
Quo)
2 (NonEngineers,
Status
Quo)

32

68

0.471

23

58

0.397

Z = 0.84 P-Value = 0.402
Fisher's Exact Test P-Value = 0.472
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5.3 Status Quo Bias
The primary status quo bias investigation in this study was based upon the
existing status quo survey from Burmeister and Schade (2007), and was analyzed using a
range of tools as described in Chapter 4 of this document. The first portion of the analysis
incorporated a χ2 test for independence. The test was conducted for each of the six status
quo bias questions, and was done separately for engineers and non-engineers.
A separate χ2 test for independence was performed with the responses for each of
the six questions in the instrument, for both engineers and non-engineers. Each question
in the instrument had three possible options, and amongst the four survey versions each
option was once neutral, once the status quo, and twice an alternative to the status quo.
The χ2 test for independence for each question was then constructed with three columns
representing the number of respondents choosing each of the three options, and four rows
representing the numbers of responses for each of the different survey versions.
Therefore, the option selection frequency data for each question was tested as a 4 x 3
contingency table. The de facto null hypothesis was independence between the rows,
which would mean the frequency of option choices would not change significantly
between survey versions, indicating no status quo bias. In other words, if there was no
status quo bias present, there would not be a statistically significant difference in the
number of responses choosing each of the three options between the different versions of
the survey. A rejection of the null, finding dependence based on the survey version,
would indicate a bias, because it would show significant differences in the numbers
choosing a particular option based on whether that option was neutral, status quo or an
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alternative to the status quo. This test was performed for each question for both engineers
and non-engineers.
The summarized χ2 and p-value data from the χ2 tests for independence for each
question for the engineer group can be seen in Table 5.14. The summarized data from the
χ2 tests for independence for the non-engineer group can be seen in Table 5.15. Questions
with an indicated p-value below 0.05 were those for which the null hypothesis for the χ2
test for independence, which was independence between survey versions, was rejected.
This indicated the presence of a status quo bias. For the non-engineer sample,
dependence on survey version was seen in four of the six questions at the 5% level of
significance, providing considerable evidence for the existence of the status quo bias
within the general sample. This result would match the findings of the prior study
(Burmeister and Schade, 2007). For the engineer sample, two of the six questions showed
a dependence on survey version at the 5% level of significance. This indicated that there
was some status quo bias amongst engineers, but that it was more weakly manifested than
in non-engineers.

Table 5.14: Status Quo Bias χ2 Test Summary by Question, Engineers
Question
2
3
4
5
6
7

χ2
13.560
16.390
7.638
41.784
6.938
5.148
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p-value
0.035
0.12
0.266
<0.001
0.327
0.525

Table 5.15: Status Quo Bias χ2 Test Summary by Question, Non-Engineers
Question
2
3
4
5
6
7

χ2
31.092
19.208
9.171
33.054
5.445
13.974

p-value
<0.001
0.004
0.164
<0.001
0.488
0.030

The next step in analyzing the status quo bias data was to perform two proportion
tests on each option of each question for engineers and non-engineers. This was the
method of analysis used in the prior study (Burmeister and Schade, 2007) from which the
status quo questions were drawn. For each answer option of each question, the proportion
of respondents choosing that option when it was the status quo was tested against the
proportion of respondents choosing the same option when it was neutral, and against the
proportion of respondents choosing the same option when it was an alternative to the
status quo. Where the proportions were significantly different, respondents chose the
option more or less often based on whether or not it was the status quo choice. This
indicated a status quo bias for that question. This method generated six two-proportion
tests per survey question, comparing the frequency of selection of each option in each
status it might occupy.
The summarized proportion and p-value data for engineers can be seen in Table
5.16. The summarized proportion and p-value data for non-engineers can be seen in
Table 5.17. Fisher’s exact p-value was also calculated for each pair, but it did not have a
substantive difference from the normal p-value determined in any case. In the summary
tables, the proportions of respondents choosing each option when it was the status quo,
neutral, or an alternative to the status quo are shown for each question. The tables further
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show the p-values obtained in two-proportion testing. For each answer option of each
question, the two p-levels shown are for the comparison of the proportion choosing that
option when it was the status quo to the proportion choosing the option when it was
neutral, and for the comparison of the proportion choosing that option when it was the
status quo to the proportion choosing that option when it was an alternative to the status
quo. Again, this yielded six two-proportion tests for each survey question. Where the
proportions differ significantly, a status quo bias was indicated. In the non-engineer
sample, eight pairs of proportions out of 36 total comparisons tested were different at the
10% level of significance. This was fewer than in the prior study (Burmeister and Schade,
2007); however, this still indicated the presence of a bias within the general population,
although in one instance the bias was away from the status quo. In the engineer group,
five pairs out of 36 total comparisons tested were different at the 10% level of
significance. This indicated some amount of bias, but weaker than the bias seen in the
non-engineer group. Of the five significant pairs, three involved a small proportion,
which might have skewed the finding of significance for those pairs. In that case, the
status quo bias for engineers would be extremely weak.
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Table 5.16: Status Quo Bias Two Proportion Tests for Engineer Sample

Question

Answer
Option

2
2
2
3
3
3
4
4
4
5
5
5
6
6
6
7
7
7

Option 1
Option 2
Option 3
Option 1
Option 2
Option 3
Option 1
Option 2
Option 3
Option 1
Option 2
Option 3
Option 1
Option 2
Option 3
Option 1
Option 2
Option 3

Alternative
Status
to the
p-level
Quo Neutral
Status Quo (SQ-N)
(SQ)
(ASQ)
25/45
18/30
29/51
0.702
12/45
4/30
13/51
0.141
8/45
8/30
9/51
0.368
18/47
9/30
19/49
0.449
19/47
16/30
27/49
0.265
10/47
5/30
3/49
0.611
11/33
14/30
26/59
0.277
14/33
14/30
23/59
0.735
8/33
2/30
10/59
0.044
18/57
6/30
14/39
0.225
20/57
6/30
14/39
0.118
19/57
18/30
11/39
0.014
17/34
15/30
40/62
1.000
11/34
11/30
20/62
0.717
6/34
4/30
2/62
0.632
4/37
2/30
5/59
0.545
8/37
4/30
11/59
0.367
25/37
24/30
43/59
0.241
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p-level
(SQASQ)
0.897
0.896
0.987
0.962
0.146
0.028
0.304
0.748
0.413
0.661
0.935
0.023
0.167
0.992
0.037
0.709
0.725
0.581

Table 5.17: Status Quo Bias Two Proportion Tests for Non-engineer Sample

Question

Answer
Option

2
2
2
3
3
3
4
4
4
5
5
5
6
6
6
7
7
7

Option 1
Option 2
Option 3
Option 1
Option 2
Option 3
Option 1
Option 2
Option 3
Option 1
Option 2
Option 3
Option 1
Option 2
Option 3
Option 1
Option 2
Option 3

Alternative
Status
to the
p-level
Quo Neutral
Status Quo (SQ-N)
(SQ)
(ASQ)
24/53
15/36
17/35
0.735
16/53
15/36
13/35
0.268
13/53
6/36
5/35
0.359
19/45
20/36
19/43
0.229
12/45
20/36
14/43
0.006
14/45
7/36
10/43
0.222
5/33
13/36
18/51
0.039
17/33
18/36
21/51
0.900
11/33
5/36
12/51
0.053
19/52
8/36
11/36
0.137
15/52
14/36
11/36
0.328
18/52
14/36
14/36
0.683
23/29
23/36
48/59
0.160
5/29
9/36
9/59
0.441
1/29
4/36
2/59
0.219
8/32
3/36
4/56
0.062
3/32
10/36
6/56
0.042
21/32
23/36
46/56
0.881

p-level
(SQASQ)
0.762
0.500
0.221
0.853
0.545
0.405
0.028
0.352
0.333
0.557
0.863
0.683
0.822
0.814
0.989
0.033
0.839
0.093

The next analysis step in evaluating the presence of status quo bias and whether it
manifested differently in engineers was analysis of variance. This analysis attempted to
distinguish whether there were any differences in responses based on certain
“treatments,” in this case the survey versions. The MANOVA used the entire set of
answers from the status quo questions of each survey in an attempt to distinguish between
the survey versions. No distinction between the survey versions would indicate that there
was no significant difference between answers to the questions regardless of whether the
answers were defined as a status quo or not. This would mean no status quo bias was
evident. A difference between survey versions would indicate that respondent answers
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did vary based on which answers options were designated as a status quo. This would
indicate a potential status quo bias. This analysis was performed on the engineer group
only. The results of the MANOVA including all status quo bias questions are
summarized in Table 5.18. Three different criteria for determining a multivariate
difference between responses are shown, all of which were significant at the 1% level and
indicated a significant difference between the survey versions. This showed that
respondent answers differed significantly between survey versions due to designations of
different answer options as a status quo. This points to the existence of a status quo bias.
To supplement the results of the MANOVA, a simple ANOVA was performed on each
survey question individually. For each question, if the ANOVA showed a significant
difference between the responses based on the survey version, it would indicate a status
quo bias manifesting for the particular question. The results of ANOVA on each question
individually are summarized in Table 5.19. Three of the six questions indicated a
difference in survey version significant at the 5% level. The difference in each question
between survey versions was simply the designation of the answer options as neutral,
status quo or alternative to the status quo. A significant difference shown in the ANOVA
then indicated status quo bias for the question. The questions shown to specifically elicit
a status quo bias in the ANOVA results generally corresponded to the same questions
found to be significant in the χ2 tests for independence. This further indicated some
degree of status quo bias exists within the engineer group.
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Table 5.18: Status Quo Bias MANOVA Summary
Criterion
Wilks'
LawleyHotelling
Pillai's

Statistic Approx F Num Denom
0.625
2.829
21.000 333.000

P
<0.001

0.541

2.951

21.000 344.000

<0.001

0.414

2.700

21.000 354.000

<0.001

Table 5.19: Status Quo Bias Summary of ANOVA
Question
2
3
4
5
6
7

F
2.88
3.1
0.47
12.38
0.8
0.35

P-Value
0.039
0.029
0.703
<0.001
0.498
0.792

R^2
6.6
7.08
1.15
23.34
1.92
0.85

The final step in evaluating the presence of status quo bias and whether it
manifested differently in engineers was to perform two discriminant analyses. The results
of the preceding MANOVA showed that the discriminant analysis on this data may be
illustrative. The discriminant analysis created a function based on predictor variables, in
this case the answers to the status quo bias questions, and used this function to classify
each respondent based on a certain response variable, such as engineer versus nonengineer status. The discriminant analysis then compared the predictions to the actual
data provided. For example, the function attempted to determine whether each respondent
was an engineer or non-engineer based on the answers to the survey questions, then
compared those predictions to the actual engineer or non-engineer status supplied for
each respondent. The discriminant analysis provided the proportion of correct
classifications based on the predictive function. This correct proportion was compared to
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the probability of randomly assigning correct classifications, denoted as Cpro. In other
words, the Cpro value was the number of responses expected to be correctly classified
based on pure guessing without the benefit of any kind of prediction function. The
prediction and classification of the discriminant analysis showing an improvement of
25% or more over the Cpro value is widely considered significant (Sheth, 2011). If the
discriminant analysis was able to correctly classify responses at a statistically significant
rate, i.e. at least 25% greater accuracy than guessing, this would indicate that the groups
of the response variable were significantly different.
In the current investigation, the first discriminant analysis sought to determine
whether responses from the entire data set could correctly be identified as from engineers
or non-engineers. The discriminant analysis must be done separately for each survey
version because the surveys differ. For each survey version, if the discriminant analysis
could predict with significant accuracy whether responses came from an engineer or nonengineer, this would indicate that there was a difference between the way engineers and
non-engineers answered the status quo questions. This in turn would indicate a difference
in the exhibition of status quo bias between engineers and non-engineers.
The summarized discriminant analysis results can be seen in Table 5.20. The
proportion correctly assigned by the discriminant analysis prediction function, the actual
numbers of engineers and non-engineers that responded to each survey version, the Cpro
value of expected prediction accuracy based on random guessing, and the percentage of
improvement of the discriminant analysis prediction function over the Cpro value are
shown for each survey version. The summary shown gives the proportions correctly
classified using a linear discriminant function. A quadratic function could also be

72

attempted, but in many cases with the data it was not possible to use a quadratic
prediction function. Where the quadratic function can be used, it typically has better
success than the linear function. As shown in discriminating engineers from nonengineers in the complete data set, the discriminant function was significantly better, i.e.
at least a 25% improvement over the Cpro value for random guessing, on survey versions
B, C, and D, and was still a 20.2% improvement in survey version A. This meant that the
discriminant analysis could accurately predict whether a respondent was an engineer or
non-engineer at a significant level in three of four survey versions, and near significant in
the fourth. This indicated there was a notable difference between engineers and nonengineers in the way they answered the status quo bias questions, and thus the degree to
which they exhibited the status quo bias.

Table 5.20: Status Quo Bias Discriminant Analysis Summary Engineer vs. Non-engineer
Survey
A
B
C
D

Proportion
Correct
0.606
0.625
0.707
0.694

Engineer
30
32
28
36

NonEngineer
36
32
30
26

Total

Cpro

66
64
58
62

0.504
0.5
0.501
0.513

Percent
Better
20.2%
25.0%
41.2%
35.3%

The second discriminant analysis performed on the status quo bias data was
performed within the engineer group only, and sought to discriminate between the four
survey versions. In this case, the answers to all of the status quo bias questions within the
engineer group were tested to determine if they could be used to correctly classify
respondents based on the versions of the survey they received. The version of the survey
was the response that the discriminant analysis prediction function was attempting to
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correctly identify based on the respondent’s answers. Successful discrimination would
indicate a notable difference between survey responses. This would indicate a potential
status quo bias. If the discriminant analysis could not successfully distinguish between
survey versions, it would mean the responses to questions were not noticeably different
between versions. This would not be indicative of any bias in the answers.
The summary of results from this discriminant analysis can be seen in Table 5.21.
The proportion correctly classified by the discriminant analysis prediction function is
shown, along with the actual numbers of respondents taking each survey, the Cpro value
that represents the expected prediction accuracy of random guessing, and the percentage
of improvement of the discriminant analysis prediction function over the Cpro value.
While the function correctly assigned respondents based on the survey version in less
than half of cases, this rate of correct classification was still a significant improvement
over random assignment, at an 85.6% improvement over the Cpro value. This degree of
improvement of the discriminant analysis prediction function over random guessing
indicated that there was a difference in the way engineers answered the various versions
of the survey, therefore indicating some degree of status quo bias within the engineer
sample.

Table 5.21: Status Quo Bias Discriminant Analysis Summary, Survey Version Within
Engineer Sample
Proportion
Correct
0.468

Survey
A
30

Survey
B
32

Survey
C
28

74

Survey
D
36

Total

Cpro

126

0.252

%
Better
85.6%

5.4 Status Quo Bias – Design
The secondary status quo bias investigation in this study concerned the question
of whether the bias might manifest differently in a question regarding an engineering
design problem than in the status quo bias questions based on financial and business
decisions. Like the other status quo bias questions, the design question had three possible
options. In one version of the survey, the options were neutral, and, in the other three
versions, each answer option took a turn as the status quo option. This question included
one option with promising material properties, but largely untested in actual use. The
question was not intended to demonstrate any difference in status quo bias on its own, but
rather to indicate whether future work in that area might be promising. This question was
analyzed similarly to the other status quo questions using χ2 tests for independence and
two proportion tests on the options. The tests were performed on the engineer group and
the non-engineer group separately.
As with the other status quo questions, the χ2 tests for independence were
performed as a 4 x 3 contingency table in which the columns were the three possible
answer options for the question and the rows were the four different survey versions. The
null hypothesis was that the responses did not vary based on survey (i.e. are independent)
and so no status quo bias was shown for the design question. As before, rejection of the
null hypothesis would indicate that the answers had a dependence on the survey type and
thus a potential status quo bias for the design question.
The results of the χ2 tests for independence are summarized in Table 5.22. For the
design question, the null hypothesis was not rejected, meaning there was not a
statistically significant difference in the answers to the design question between the
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different versions of the survey. Although the non-engineer group had a much higher χ2
value than the engineer group, neither show a statistically significant dependence on
survey type, with p-values of 0.290 and 0.939 respectively. These results indicate the
status quo bias did not manifest in this engineering design based question.

Table 5.22: Design Status Quo Bias, Summary of χ2 Tests for Independence
χ2
7.346
1.773

Group
Non-engineers
Engineers

p-value
0.290
0.939

The other analysis of the status quo bias in the design question involved two
proportion tests on each option, just as in the previous status quo questions. As before,
the proportion of times an option was chosen as the status quo was compared to the
proportion of times that option was chosen as neutral, and to the proportion of times that
option was chosen as an alternative to the status quo. A significant difference in the
proportion of respondents choosing an answer option when that answer option was the
status quo versus neutral or an alternative to the status quo would indicated some amount
of status quo bias. This testing again resulted in six comparisons of proportions for the
design question. This was done separately for the engineer and non-engineer groups.
The results for comparisons in the engineer group can be seen in Table 5.23. The
results for comparisons in the non-engineer group can be seen in Table 5.24. None of the
comparisons of proportions was significant in the engineer group, while one of the six
comparisons of proportions was significant at the 10% level in the non-engineer group.
This indicated no status quo bias in the design question for engineers, and weak status
quo bias for non-engineers. It was also noteworthy that the promising but untested design
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option, option 3, was widely favored in both groups: Engineers chose this option 82 of
126 times, while non-engineers chose it 84 of 124 times.

Table 5.23: Design Status Quo Bias Two Proportion Tests, Engineer Sample
Alternative
Status
to the
p-level
Quo Neutral
Status Quo (SQ-N)
(SQ)
(ASQ)
Option 1 5/35
2/30
9/61
0.307
Option 2 7/35
6/30
15/61
1.000
Option 3 23/35
22/30
37/61
0.503
Answer
Options

p-level
(SQASQ)
0.950
0.599
0.619

Table 5.24: Design Status Quo Bias Two Proportion Tests, Non-engineer Sample
Alternative
Status
to the
p-level
Quo Neutral
Status Quo (SQ-N)
(SQ)
(ASQ)
Option 1 5/32
2/36
10/56
0.178
Option 2 9/32
7/36
7/56
0.401
Option 3 18/32
27/36
39/56
0.099
Answer
Options

p-level
(SQASQ)
0.786
0.086
0.211

5.5 Engineering Managers
A further secondary objective of this study was to determine whether there were
distinguishable differences in the decision making of working-level engineers and of
current or former engineering managers. The engineer group was segmented into
managers and non-managers for this portion of the analysis. Differences between
managers and non-managers were investigated using two-proportion tests on the
ambiguity aversion question and discriminant analysis on the status quo bias questions.
Within the engineer group, 44.4% identified themselves as currently or formerly
managing engineers as direct reports, while 55.6% identified themselves as having never
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managed engineers as direct reports. The breakdown of self-identified current or former
managers within the engineer sample can be seen in Table 5.25. Not surprisingly, a
majority did not identify themselves as current or former managers of engineers.

Table 5.25: Breakdown of Engineering Managers
Engineering
Managers
Manager
Non-Manager

Number of
Responses
56
70

Percent of
Responses
44.4%
55.6%

To determine whether engineering managers exhibited ambiguity aversion to a
different degree than working-level engineers, two proportion tests were performed to
compare the proportion of managers choosing the unambiguous option to the proportion
of non-managers choosing the unambiguous option in both the basic and modified
ambiguity aversion experiments. As shown previously, engineers as a whole
demonstrated very strong ambiguity aversion, and as a whole engineers were affected by
the addition of a status quo component in the ambiguity question. If the proportion of
managers choosing the unambiguous option differed significantly from the proportion of
non-managers choosing the unambiguous option, this would indicate a difference in the
exhibition of ambiguity aversion between managers and non-managers. Likewise, if the
proportions choosing the unambiguous option in the modified experiment were to differ
significantly, this would indicate a difference in the impact of a status quo component
between managers and non-managers. The results for the basic version of the question,
the proportions of managers and non-managers choosing the unambiguous option and the
p-value from the comparison of the two proportions, can be seen in Table 5.26. The
results for the modified version of the question with a status quo component, the
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proportions of managers and non-managers choosing the unambiguous option and the pvalue from the comparison of the two proportions, can be seen in Table 5.27. Although a
larger proportion of managers chose the unambiguous option in each case, the difference
in proportion of choice between managers and non-managers was not statistically
significant in either version of the ambiguity aversion experiment, indicating there was
not a significant difference between the way managers and non-managers exhibit
ambiguity aversion.

Table 5.26: Engineering Manager Two Proportion Test on Basic Ambiguity Aversion
Experiment
X (Number N (Total
choosing
Number
Sample
unambiguous
of
urn)
samples)
Non-Managers
22
27
Managers
28
31

Sample p

Z = 0.96 P-Value = 0.335
Fisher's Exact Test P-Value = 0.453
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0.815
0.903

Table 5.27: Engineering Manager Two Proportion Test on Ambiguity Aversion
Experiment with Status Quo Component
X (Number N (Total
choosing
Number
Sample
unambiguous
of
urn)
samples)
Non-Managers
18
43
Managers
14
25

Sample p
0.419
0.56

Z = 1.14 P-Value = 0.256
Fisher's Exact Test P-Value = 0.318

To test for a difference in the way managers and non-managers exhibited any
status quo bias, a discriminant analysis was used. The discriminant analysis attempts to
classify respondents within the engineer sample as manager or non-manager using a
prediction function based on the responses to the status quo questions. The discriminant
analysis must be repeated for each version of the survey because the versions differ from
each other. The proportion of respondents correctly classified as manager or non-manager
by the discriminant analysis prediction function was then compared to the proportion that
would be expected to be correctly classified with random selection, a value called Cpro.
If the discriminant analysis could correctly classify respondents 25% or more better than
the Cpro value for random guessing, the results would be considered significant. The
summarized results of the discriminant analysis can be seen in Table 5.28. The
discriminant analysis showed significant accuracy in classifying respondents as manager
or non-manager in surveys B and D, and an improvement in accuracy over Cpro of just
over 20% in survey A. In survey C, the improvement in accuracy over Cpro did not
approach significance. This indicated that there may be some weak distinction between
managers and non-managers in terms of the manifestation of status quo bias.
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Table 5.28: Engineering Manager Discriminant Analysis
Survey
A
B
C
D

Proportion
Correct
0.7
0.813
0.571
0.778

Manager
21
11
10
14

NonManager
9
21
18
22

Total

Cpro

% Better

30
32
28
36

0.58
0.549
0.541
0.525

20.7%
48.1%
5.6%
48.3%

Where the discriminant analysis indicated a difference between groups, it was of
interest to specify which group had a stronger or weaker manifestation of status quo bias.
One approach to do so was to compare the proportion of choices of a status quo option of
one group to the other, neglecting the neutral survey. In this case, the proportion of
managers choosing the status quo option for each question was compared to the
proportion of non-managers choosing the status quo option for each question. If the two
proportions were significantly different between managers and non-managers on a
question, it would indicate a difference in the exhibition of any status quo bias between
the two groups for that question. A summary of the two proportion tests comparing
managers to non-managers for each question can be seen in Table 5.29. Non-managers
had a higher proportion choosing the status quo option in six of seven questions;
however, none of the proportions on a single question were considered different enough
to be statistically significant in the two proportion testing. If there was a distinction
between the two groups, this might weakly indicate that managers would exhibit less
status quo bias; however, the present results could not demonstrate this difference in a
statistically significant manner.
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Table 5.29: Two Proportion Status Quo Bias Test on Managers
Question
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Manager
Status Quo
14/35
18/35
11/32
21/35
10/35
13/35
10/35

Non-Manager
Status Quo
31/61
29/61
22/60
36/61
24/61
24/61
25/61

p-level
0.301
0.714
0.826
0.925
0.275
0.831
0.210

5.6 Work Environment
Another secondary objective of this study was to determine whether there was a
difference in decision making between engineers who worked in a predominantly team
environment and those who worked in a predominantly working group environment. The
definitions of team and working group given to respondents can be seen in the survey in
Appendix A. The differences between those in team versus working group environments
were tested much the same way as engineering managers were tested. The engineer group
was segmented into team, neutral or confounded and working group environments for
this portion of the analysis. Differences between team and working group were
investigated using two-proportion tests on the ambiguity aversion question and
discriminant analysis on the status quo bias questions. The breakdown of respondents
into team, neutral or confounded, and working group environments, as simplified from
the original seven-point Likert scale, can be seen in Table 5.30. The respondents were
somewhat evenly split between team and working group, with a smaller number selfidentified as being between the two types of environments or confounded.
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Table 5.30: Breakdown of Work Environment Responses
Work
Environment
Working Group
Neutral
(Confounded)
Team

Number of
Responses
48

Percent of Responses
38.1%

22

17.5%

56

44.4%

To determine whether work environment impacted the manner in which engineers
exhibited ambiguity aversion, two proportion tests were performed between the
proportion of team engineers choosing the unambiguous option and the proportion of
working group engineers choosing the unambiguous option in both the basic and
modified versions of the ambiguity aversion experiment. For the purposes of this test
those identifying as neutral or confounded were deliberately excluded. As shown
previously, engineers as a whole demonstrated very strong ambiguity aversion, and as a
whole engineers were affected by the addition of a status quo component in the ambiguity
question. If the proportion of team engineers choosing the unambiguous option differed
significantly from the proportion of working group engineers choosing the unambiguous
option, this would indicate a difference in the manifestation of ambiguity aversion
between engineers in the two environments. The results for the basic version of the
ambiguity aversion experiment, the proportions of team and working group engineers
choosing the unambiguous option and the p-value from the comparison of the two
proportions, can be seen in Table 5.31. The results for the modified version of the
experiment that contained a status quo component, the proportions of team and working
group engineers choosing the unambiguous option and the p-value from the comparison
of the two proportions, can be seen in Table 5.32. In neither case did the proportions
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differ significantly, indicating there was no difference in ambiguity aversion between
engineers who worked predominantly in a team environment and those who worked
predominantly in a working group environment.

Table 5.31: Work Environment Two Proportion Test on Basic Ambiguity Aversion
Question

Sample
Working Group
Team

X (Number N (Total
choosing
Number
unambiguous
of
urn)
samples)
20
23
23
26

Sample p
0.870
0.885

Z = 0.16 P-Value = 0.873
Fisher's Exact Test P-Value = 1

Table 5.32: Work Environment Two Proportion Test on Modified Ambiguity Aversion
Question

Sample
Working Group
Team

X (Number N (Total
choosing
Number
unambiguous
of
urn)
samples)
11
25
15
30

Sample p
0.440
0.500

Z = 0.44 P-Value = 0.656
Fisher's Exact Test P-Value = 0.788

To test for a difference in status quo bias between the different work
environments, a discriminant analysis was used on the three work environment segments
within the engineer group: team, neutral or confounded, and working group. The
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discriminant analysis attempted to classify respondents into the three work environment
subgroups noted, and compared the proportion correctly classified to the proportion
expected to be classified correctly from random selection, called the Cpro value. If the
discriminant analysis prediction function could correctly classify respondents at a rate at
least 25% better than the Cpro value expected for random guessing, this would indicate a
significant difference in the way engineers in the three work environments answer the
status quo questions, and thus in the degree to which they exhibited the status quo bias.
The analysis must be repeated for each version of the survey because the survey versions
differ from each other. The summarized results, with the proportion correctly classified
by the discriminant analysis prediction function, the actual numbers from each group, the
Cpro value, and the amount of improvement over the Cpro value of the discriminant
analysis prediction, can be seen in Table 5.33. The discrimination function classified
respondents correctly a little over half the time for most of the surveys, and was
significantly better than random selection in three of the four survey versions. This
indicated that there may be a difference in status quo bias between engineers in a team
environment and those in a working group environment, since the survey answers could
be used to classify with which group the respondent identified.

Table 5.33: Work Environment Discriminant Analysis
Survey
A
B
C
D

Proportion
Correct
0.733
0.625
0.500
0.556

Working
Neutral Team Total
Group
17
3
10
30
10
5
17
32
6
6
16
28
15
8
13
36
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Cpro
0.442
0.404
0.418
0.353

%
Better
65.8%
54.6%
19.5%
57.3%

With the discriminant analysis indicating a potential difference between engineers
in the different types of work environment, a set of two-proportion comparisons was
again conducted between groups. The neutral survey was again excluded for the
comparison, and, in the case of work environment, the team and working group segments
were compared and the neutral or confounded group was excluded. In this case, the
proportion of team engineers choosing the status quo option for each question was
compared to the proportion of working group engineers choosing the status quo option
for each question. If the two proportions were significantly different between team
engineers and working group engineers on a question, it would indicate a difference in
the exhibition of any status quo bias between the two groups for that question. A
summary of two proportion tests comparing team environment to working group
environment for each question can be seen in Table 5.34. Members of teams chose the
status quo in a greater proportion in four of seven questions, and none of the proportions
on a single question were different enough to be statistically significant in the two
proportion testing. These results could not be considered to show that engineers in either
a team or working group environment were significantly more prone to status quo bias.

Table 5.34: Two Proportion Status Quo Bias Test on Work Environment
Question
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Team
Status Quo
23/46
21/46
17/45
26/46
19/46
15/46
14/46

Working Group
Status Quo
11/31
14/31
11/31
19/31
9/31
13/31
14/31
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p-level
0.247
0.966
0.838
0.676
0.261
0.407
0.189

5.7 Status Quo Bias in Basic Demographics
Each of the basic demographic factors collected were tested within the engineer
group to determine whether they had any significant impact on the presence or degree of
status quo bias. These factors were tested using discriminant analysis, which attempted to
predict which demographic category a respondent belonged to based on the respondent’s
answers. The results for tests on the highest level of educational attainment, age and
years of experience will be reported in this section. The results for gender, race/ethnicity,
and government status were not significant and may be seen in Appendix C.
Within the engineer sample, the level of highest educational attainment was
reduced to those with a bachelor’s degree and those with a master’s or higher. As shown
in section 5.1, a small majority were in the master’s or higher category. The discriminant
analysis attempted to classify respondents into the two education subgroups noted, and
compared the proportion correctly classified to the proportion expected to be classified
correctly from random selection, called the Cpro value. If the discriminant analysis
prediction function could correctly classify respondents at a rate at least 25% better than
the Cpro value expected for random guessing, this would indicate a significant difference
in the way engineers in the two educational attainment groups answer the status quo
questions, and thus in the degree to which they exhibited the status quo bias. The analysis
was repeated for each version of the survey because the survey versions differed from
each other. The summarized results, with the proportion correctly classified by the
discriminant analysis prediction function, the actual numbers from each group, the Cpro
value, and the amount of improvement over the Cpro value of the discriminant analysis
prediction, can be seen in Table 5.35. In three of the four survey versions, the
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discriminant function was significantly better than random selection, indicating that
education level may have had an impact on degree of status quo bias.

Table 5.35: Discriminant Analysis on Education
Survey
A
B
C
D

Prop
Correct
0.800
0.813
0.679
0.583

Bachelor Graduate Total
13
13
14
17

17
19
14
19

30
32
28
36

Cpro
0.509
0.516
0.500
0.502

%
Better
57.2%
57.1%
35.8%
16.2%

The discriminant analysis indicated a difference between the two education levels,
so two proportion tests were conducted for each question on the proportion of status quo
choices each group made. The neutral survey was again neglected for this comparison. In
this case, the proportion of engineers with bachelor’s degrees choosing the status quo
option for each question was compared to the proportion of engineers with master’s
degrees or higher choosing the status quo option for each question. If the two proportions
were significantly different between the two educational attainment groups on a question,
it would indicate a difference in the exhibition of any status quo bias between the two
groups for that question. A summary of two proportion tests comparing the two
educational attainment groups for each question can be seen in Table 5.36. The
proportion of status quo choices was higher for the bachelor’s degree group in four out of
seven questions. These four included the only question in which the difference in
proportions was significant at the 10% level. This result at most showed a slightly higher
presence of status quo bias in those with only a bachelor’s degree.
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Table 5.36: Two Proportion Test for SQB on Education Level
Master's or
higher
22/52
21/52
17/49
28/52
21/52
21/52
21/52

Question Bachelor's
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

23/44
26/44
16/43
29/44
13/44
16/44
14/44

p-level
0.328
0.063
0.802
0.225
0.263
0.686
0.381

The age of respondents within the engineer group was the next demographic
factor to be tested. For analysis, respondents were grouped into age ranges of under 30,
30-49, and 50 and over. The discriminant analysis attempted to classify respondents into
the three age subgroups noted, and compared the proportion correctly classified to the
proportion expected to be classified correctly from random selection, called the Cpro
value. If the discriminant analysis prediction function could correctly classify
respondents at a rate at least 25% better than the Cpro value expected for random
guessing, this would indicate a significant difference in the way engineers in the three age
groups answer the status quo questions, and thus in the degree to which they exhibited the
status quo bias. The analysis must be repeated for each version of the survey because the
survey versions differ from each other. The summarized results, with the proportion
correctly classified by the discriminant analysis prediction function, the actual numbers
from each group, the Cpro value, and the amount of improvement over the Cpro value of
the discriminant analysis prediction, can be seen in Table 5.37. The discriminant function
correctly classified respondents into the appropriate age group for more than half of the
respondents. While this success rate was not extremely impressive, it was a significant
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improvement over random selection and may indicate that age plays a role in status quo
bias.

Table 5.37: Discriminant Analysis on Age
Survey
A
B
C
D

Proportion
Correct
0.600
0.625
0.571
0.556

Under
30 years
3
9
10
11

30-49 50+
Total
years years
15
12
30
16
7
32
12
6
28
18
7
36

Cpro
0.420
0.377
0.357
0.381

%
Better
42.9%
65.8%
59.9%
45.9%

The discriminant analysis indicated a difference between the three age groups, so
a partial set of two proportion tests was conducted on the proportions of choice of a status
quo option. The largest age group, 30-49, was compared to those younger and those
older. The neutral survey was again neglected for these comparisons. In this case, the
proportion of engineers in the 30-49 age group choosing the status quo option for each
question was compared to the proportion of engineers in the under 30 age group and the
50+ age group choosing the status quo option for each question. If the two proportions
were significantly different between the 30-49 age group and either of the other two age
groups, it would indicate a difference in the exhibition of any status quo bias between the
groups for that question. A summary of the two proportion tests comparing the age
groups for each question can be seen in Table 5.38. In a majority of cases, the proportion
of status quo choices dropped with age. In the two comparisons that were significant at
the 10% level, one showed that the 50+ group had a significantly lower proportion, and
the other showed the 30-49 group as the lowest proportion of status quo choices. This
may provide an indication that status quo bias was reduced with age.
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Table 5.38: Two Proportion SQB Testing on Age
Question

Under
30 years

30-49
years

50+
years

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

15/30
17/30
9/32
20/30
14/30
9/30
7/30

24/46
20/46
16/40
26/46
12/46
21/46
19/46

6/20
10/20
8/20
11/20
8/20
7/20
9/20

p-level (under
30 years to 3049 years)
1.000
0.257
0.285
0.369
0.066
0.160
0.140

p-level (30-49
years to 50+
years)
0.079
0.625
1.000
0.909
0.274
0.411
0.781

The years of experience of respondents within the engineer sample was the final
demographic factor to show potential for significance. Respondents were grouped into
five categories of years of experience: 0-5 years, 6-10 years, 11-15 years, 16-20 years,
and 20+ years. The discriminant analysis attempted to classify respondents into the five
experience subgroups noted, and compared the proportion correctly classified to the
proportion expected to be classified correctly from random selection, called the Cpro
value. If the discriminant analysis prediction function could correctly classify
respondents at a rate at least 25% better than the Cpro value expected for random
guessing, this would indicate a significant difference in the way engineers in the five
experience groups answered the status quo questions, and thus in the degree to which
they exhibited the status quo bias. The analysis must be repeated for each version of the
survey because the survey versions differ from each other. The summarized results, with
the proportion correctly classified by the discriminant analysis prediction function, the
actual numbers from each group, the Cpro value, and the amount of improvement over
the Cpro value of the discriminant analysis prediction, can be seen in Table 5.39. Years
of experience would be expected to correlate strongly with age, so it was no surprise that
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the discriminant function had a success rate similar to that for the age demographic. Due
to the strong correlation with age and some relatively small sample sizes, no two
proportion tests were deemed necessary for the experience ranges. Again, the success rate
was only a small amount over 50% for each survey version, but did represent a
significant improvement over the Cpro value. This might indicate a difference in status
quo bias based on experience, with less propensity toward the status quo at higher
experience levels.

Table 5.39: Discriminant Analysis on Experience

Survey

Proportion
Correct

0-5
years

A
B
C
D

0.567
0.500
0.571
0.500

3
10
9
11

6-10
yea
rs
5
5
5
4

11-15
years

16-20
years

9
4
6
9

2
3
2
3

20+
yea Total
rs
11
30
10
32
6
28
9
36

Cpro

%
Better

0.267
0.244
0.232
0.238

112.6%
104.8%
146.0%
110.4%

5.8 Summary of Results
Three primary research hypotheses and four secondary research hypotheses were
investigated in the data and analysis presented in this chapter. These hypotheses followed
from the research questions presented in Chapter 3, and have been explored in the
preceding analysis steps.
For the primary hypotheses, ambiguity aversion was explored through a series of
χ2 tests for independence and two-proportion tests. Ambiguity aversion was shown to be
very strong in engineers, significantly stronger than in non-engineers, and it was shown
that status quo bias tends to be stronger than ambiguity aversion. Status quo bias was
tested with χ2 tests for independence and two-proportion tests, as well as MANOVA and
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discriminant analyses, and was shown to exist in engineers but in a weaker manner than
in non-engineers.
For the secondary hypotheses, the design-related status quo question elicited
somewhat different results than the other status quo questions, and so may indicate an
avenue for future work. Engineering managers were shown to exhibit ambiguity aversion
to the same degree as working-level engineers, but may exhibit slightly less status quo
bias than working-level of engineers. Work environment could not be demonstrated to
show a difference in either ambiguity aversion or status quo bias. Finally, the
demographic factors of educational attainment, age and years of experience showed some
potential for status quo bias to decline with age and experience.
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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this dissertation was to investigate whether and to what degree
engineers exhibit the related effects of ambiguity aversion and status quo bias. The
literature review in Chapter 2 of this document showed that both ambiguity aversion and
status quo bias were well established in the general population and certain businessrelated sub-groups. However, no research in the literature review addressed the question
of whether engineers were subject to these effects in the same manner as the other groups
studied. The implications of bias in engineering decision making could be extremely
important, and so this research sought to characterize this aspect of engineer behavior.
6.1 Discussion of Hypotheses and Conclusions
Several questions were presented in Chapter 3 of this document as the basis for
the present research. Do engineers exhibit the status quo bias in the same manner as the
general population? Do engineers exhibit ambiguity aversion, and, if so, is it stronger or
weaker for them than status quo bias? Do engineering managers exhibit these biases in
the same manner as working-level engineers? Does the engineer’s work environment
affect the manner in which these biases are exhibited? Do any other demographic factors
impact these biases in engineers? Is there an indication that the status quo bias manifests
differently for engineers considering design problems than engineers considering
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financial problems? In an attempt to answer these questions, three primary research
hypotheses and four secondary research hypotheses were developed. The survey
instrument described in Chapter 4 of this document was developed and administered and
the results analyzed to address the research hypotheses. Following is a discussion of these
hypotheses and summary of whether they were fully or partially supported.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Engineers exhibit the Status Quo Bias. The six questions from
the Burmeister and Schade (2007) status quo bias study were used to address whether
engineers exhibit the status quo bias. Several analysis tools were used to explore this
research hypothesis. The tests for independence between survey versions for each
question showed only two of the six to be significantly different in the engineer group,
with four of the six significantly different in the non-engineer group. This indicated that
status quo bias exists in engineers, but manifested more weakly than it did in the general
population. The two proportion tests on proportions of answers for each option of each
question for the engineers and non-engineers showed a significant difference in only five
pairs of proportions for engineers, with a significant difference in eight pairs of
proportions for non-engineers. It should be noted that both of these were somewhat fewer
than in the Burmeister and Schade (2007) study, but still indicated the existence of a
status quo bias that was manifested somewhat more weakly in engineers than nonengineers. A MANOVA further indicated the presence of a status quo bias. The
MANOVA indicated a significant difference between the four versions of the survey, and
ANOVA on each question indicated a significant difference in three of the six questions.
A discriminant analysis further pointed to a significant difference between engineers and
non-engineers in status quo bias. A second discriminant analysis within the engineer
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sample was able to classify which responses came from which survey with some
significance, again indicating a weak status quo bias in engineers. Overall, the results
supported the existence of a status quo bias amongst engineers. This hypothesis was
weakly supported, showing engineers did exhibit the bias to some degree, but did so to a
lesser degree than the general population.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Engineers exhibit Ambiguity Aversion. The first survey
question, with two surveys containing the most basic Ellsberg (1961) experiment and two
containing the most basic Roca (Roca, Hogarth, and Maule, 2006) experiment with status
quo component, was used to explore ambiguity aversion in engineers. A simple check of
the proportion choosing the unambiguous option of the Ellsberg (1961) experiment
indicated strong evidence of ambiguity aversion. Furthermore, a two-proportion test
comparing engineers to non-engineers showed a significant difference between the two
groups, with engineers more strongly exhibiting ambiguity aversion. This was interesting
because one would expect engineers to have a greater grasp on basic probability than the
general population, and so realize the probabilities were equal between the options given.
Overall, these results strongly supported the presence of ambiguity aversion in engineers,
and showed that it was stronger in engineers than in the general population.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Engineers react more strongly to Status Quo Bias than
Ambiguity Aversion. This hypothesis was also explored using the first question of the
survey. A test for independence between the frequencies of responses on the two versions
of the experiment was conducted for both the engineer and non-engineer groups, with
both showing a significant difference between versions indicating the status quo
component did impact the choice. A two proportion test was used to confirm these
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results, and again showed a significant difference between the proportions choosing the
unambiguous option for each version of the experiment for engineers and non-engineers.
Finally a two proportion test was used to compare the engineer and non-engineer groups’
frequency of responses for the version of the experiment with a status quo component.
Although engineers picked the unambiguous option more often, the difference was not
statistically significant. Overall, these results showed that engineers did react somewhat
more strongly to the status quo bias than to ambiguity aversion. This hypothesis was
supported, but it was noteworthy that the results again indicated stronger ambiguity
aversion and weaker status quo bias in engineers than in the general population.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Engineering managers exhibit the same level of Status Quo
Bias and Ambiguity Aversion as working-level engineers. This secondary objective was
explored for ambiguity aversion using a simple two proportion test to compare managers
to non-managers. Although managers chose the unambiguous option more often in both
versions of the experiment, the difference was not statistically significant. For status quo
bias, a discriminant analysis was used to distinguish between managers and nonmanagers. The discriminant function was significant on two survey versions and near
significant on a third. Proportions choosing a status quo option were then tested between
the two groups for each status quo question, including the design question. The nonmanagers chose the status quo more often in six of the seven questions; however, the
difference in proportions was not statistically significant for any of them. Overall, the
results indicated roughly the same level of ambiguity aversion between engineering
managers and working-level engineers. Analysis showed no difference between managers
and non-managers in terms of ambiguity aversion, so that portion of the hypothesis was
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supported. The status quo portion of the hypothesis was supported, but it was noteworthy
that there was some weak evidence of a difference, and that the difference would indicate
managers had less tendency toward the status quo.
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Other demographic factors do not impact level of Status Quo
Bias. The other demographic factors collected were tested for differences in status quo
bias using discriminant analysis. The analysis showed no significant distinction in terms
of gender, race/ethnicity, or status as government or non-government. Discriminant
analysis on educational attainment, age, and years of experience showed a significant
ability to correctly classify respondents based on each of those factors. Two proportion
tests on each question between the two education levels showed only one significant
question in which those with a master’s degree or higher chose the status quo option less
often. Similar tests on age had only two significant comparisons, but these seemed to
indicate status quo bias decreasing with age. Education, age, years of experience, and
perhaps managerial status as well were all closely correlated, and, in some way, were all
indicative of a respondent’s experience, so it was not surprising that these all has
similarly weak indications of a difference. It was interesting that the weak indication was
that status quo bias decreased with age. Overall, these results showed no difference with
three demographic factors, and a weak difference with the three experience-related
factors indicating reduced status quo bias with increasing age. With three demographic
factors showing no difference and three showing a weak difference, this hypothesis was
partially supported.
Hypothesis 6 (H6): Work environment does not impact level of Status Quo Bias or
Ambiguity Aversion. A respondent’s work environment was reduced down to the three
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categories of team, neutral or confounded, and working group. Ambiguity aversion was
tested with two proportion tests between the frequency of responses from team and
working group, neglecting neutral respondents. The differences between team and
working group were not significant in either version of the ambiguity experiment. Status
quo bias was tested with a discriminant analysis, with significant ability to classify
respondents based on work environment in three survey versions. However, two
proportion tests comparing proportion of status quo choices between team and working
group respondents showed no difference between the two groups. Overall, these results
supported the hypothesis that work environment did not have a significant impact on
decision making.
Hypothesis 7 (H7): There is no difference in status quo bias for engineers
between financial decisions and design decisions. The eighth survey question, based on
an engineering design problem, was intended to test this secondary hypothesis. The tests
for independence between survey types for the two samples showed no significant
difference for engineers or non-engineers, indicating no status quo bias on this question,
although it was noteworthy that the non-engineers were much closer to significance than
the engineers. In the two proportion tests on each option of the question, no pair was
significant for the engineer sample and only one pair was significant for the non-engineer
sample, again indicating no status quo bias for engineers on the design question and only
a weak bias for non-engineers. It was interesting that the promising but largely untested
option was widely favored in every version of the survey with both groups. Overall, these
results indicated that there may be a small difference in status quo bias between design
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and financial question, and that this area may warrant further study. This hypothesis was
not supported, given that some status quo bias was detected in the other survey questions.
In summary, the primary hypotheses were supported, although the support for H1
was somewhat weak. Secondary hypothesis H4 and H5 were partially supported, with
secondary hypothesis H6 supported and hypothesis H7 not supported.
6.2 Contribution to the Body of Knowledge
The conclusions denoted in the previous section mark a contribution to the body
of knowledge in the field of systems engineering and engineering management. This
contribution may have implications for the conduct and interpretation of MCDA and
trade study processes, which can have very high stakes in terms of monetary significance
and personnel significance.
In the literature concerning ambiguity aversion, engineers had not previously been
studied as a specific subgroup. This research has now demonstrated that engineers do
exhibit a very strong ambiguity aversion, and that they do so to a significantly greater
degree than non-engineers.
In the literature concerning status quo bias, certain subgroups such as bankers and
entrepreneurs had been studied apart from the general population, but engineers had not
been. This research has shown that engineers do exhibit the status quo bias, but it is
weaker in engineers than it is in the general population.
In addition to these two key contributions, certain secondary contributions have
also been made. It has been shown that despite ambiguity aversion being stronger and
status quo bias being weaker in engineers, the status quo bias does still override
ambiguity aversion to a significant degree. It has also been shown that there may be a

100

slight decrease in the existence of status quo bias with managerial status, higher
educational attainment, increased age and increased experience.
6.3 Managerial Implications and Recommendations
Some recommendations may be made based on the conclusions and contributions
described in the preceding sections. In terms of ambiguity aversion, engineers have been
shown to exhibit this behavior very strongly, significantly more so than the general
population. This is in some ways counterintuitive, since engineers have the mathematical
background to be expected to understand probabilities and know when an option is
objectively the same or superior despite having an ambiguous probability. That engineers
would be more aware that two probabilities are the same, and yet more likely to react
negatively to an equal but ambiguous probability than the general public, should serve as
a word of caution to managers and researchers. It is unclear whether there is some
underlying psychological or social factor driving this aversion to be stronger in engineers,
such as a general desire for clear requirements in engineering, but, regardless of what
causes it, one must be aware that engineers may irrationally react negatively to an
ambiguous choice or situation simply because it is ambiguous.
In terms of status quo bias, engineers have been shown to exhibit a degree of the
bias, but significantly less so than the general population. In the interaction between
status quo and ambiguity, the status quo still significantly sways engineers, but less so
than it does the general population. Although status quo bias does exist, it is weak
compared to non-engineers. For the manager or researcher conducting a trade study or
MCDA process, this means some caution is advised. The assumption that the engineers
favor the status quo in a study may not carry much weight. A small win by an alternative
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option may not be as certain as thought. Research attempting to overcome the status quo
bias in MCDA still has a place, but may not be as much an imperative as previously
thought. In other words, the status quo bias becomes somewhat murky in the engineering
population. Furthermore, the indication of the design-related question is that engineers
may show even less of a status quo bias, perhaps even status quo aversion, when it comes
to questions of engineering design rather than finance or programmatic items.
Other tested factors may have implications for the manager as well. First, the
engineering manager reacts as strongly to ambiguity as the working-level engineer, but
may exhibit less status quo bias. Furthermore, age, experience, and education level
increasing may cause a slight decrease in the manifestation of the status quo bias. Put
another way, younger and less-experienced engineers may well have a greater tendency
toward the status quo than older or more experienced engineers. Whether this slight
tendency is caused by relative ignorance or lack of confidence or by some other unknown
factor, it could have significant implications for the manager. Factors that seem to have
little or no impact on an engineer’s decision making are the primary work environment,
gender, race/ethnicity and whether the engineer has been predominantly in government or
in private industry.
6.4 Limitations and Key Assumptions
As with any study of this nature, certain limitations and assumptions apply. First,
although some geographic dispersion was achieved, the respondents are still
predominantly from the Huntsville, Alabama aerospace and defense community. It is
assumed that this does not significantly impact the responses gathered.
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Within the survey instrument, the ambiguity aversion experiments are relayed as
questions and not actually performed as experiments. The respondent is asked to imagine
that they are playing to win $100. It is assumed that this portrayal of the experiment does
not significantly change the choices or outcome. Furthermore, the ambiguity aversion
experiments are each the most basic of a set of ambiguity experiments performed by
Ellsberg (1961) and Roca (Roca, Hogarth, and Maule, 2006). It is assumed based on their
results that other more complex versions of the experiments would not have yielded
significantly different outcomes or conclusions.
Certain minor modifications were made to the status quo bias survey from the
Burmeister and Schade (2007) study. This study was conducted in Germany. To adapt the
questions for the U.S. audience, some response options were changed from a value in
Euros to a value in U.S. Dollars, and an option on the foreign market entry question was
changed from the U.S. to Australia. It is assumed that these changes have no impact on
the outcome of the survey. The current study did show some differences in outcome from
the prior study, namely somewhat less significance of status quo in the general
population. This difference is not deemed to be significant enough to invalidate either the
current or prior study.
The main battery of status quo bias questions all generally relate to financial
decisions or programmatic decisions, and not to engineering design decisions. Some of
the questions further relate to issues of minor personal significance, in contrast to the
exceptional significance of the issues covered in many trade studies. The status quo bias
shown in this battery of questions may manifest differently in more significant situations.
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The design question added to the survey provides some indication of this possibility, as it
produced a different level of status quo effect than the main questions.
6.5 Future Work
This study leaves open the need for future work in several significant areas. First,
the design question included in the survey instrument was not intended to be definitive,
but rather to gauge whether there might be a need for more research focused on
engineering design decisions. The results of this question were somewhat different from
the results of the other status quo questions, which does in fact point to a need for further
research in this direction. Future researchers would then develop and validate an
instrument related specifically to testing for status quo bias in design and engineering
trade study situations. Such an instrument may also seek to identify or isolate potential
confounding variables or underlying effects that may cause an indication of cognitive
bias in the situations studied.
Ambiguity aversion has been shown to be significantly stronger in engineers than
in the general population. This shows potential for conducting further experiments on the
topic with engineers, possibly engaging more of the original ambiguity experiments. Like
the status quo questions, it is also possible that the aversion would manifest differently in
a significant engineering situation than in the scenario presented, which could lead a
future researcher to develop ambiguity scenarios more closely related to the practice of
systems engineering.
A weak relationship appeared to surface between age or experience and a
lessening of the status quo bias. The question remains whether engineers become less
biased to the status quo with age and experience. A future researcher has ample room to
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explore whether this effect or any other biases and aversions seem to change significantly
with age.
Finally, there are numerous other biases and effects demonstrated in the literature
for economics and psychology, such as inaction inertia, framing effects, and extremeness
effects. After demonstrating some differences in ambiguity aversion and status quo bias
between engineers and the general population, researchers may be driven to explore
whether engineers differ from the general population in any of the other known biases
and aversions.
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APPENDIX A

SURVEYS

This appendix contains the four different surveys used.
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Decision making Questionnaire (Version A)
Instructions:
The following survey takes approximately 10 minutes to complete. For each question,
please select the answer that you feel would best reflect your own choice in the situation
described based on the provided information. Following the nine survey questions is a
brief demographic questionnaire.
Participation in this survey is voluntary. All responses are anonymous and no identifying
information will be collected. All survey participants must be age 19 or older. By
completing the survey you are indicating that you are age 19 or older. If you choose not
to complete the survey you are considered to have withdrawn from participation. Thank
you for your participation.
Survey Questions:
A-1. Drawing Marbles
You have the opportunity to draw a marble from an urn to win $100. There are two urns
to choose from. Each urn contains exactly 100 marbles. Draw of a black marble wins.
The first Urn (Urn U), has exactly 50 red marbles and 50 black marbles. The second Urn
(Urn A), has between 0 and 100 red marbles, with a complementary number of black
marbles. Which urn would you prefer to draw from?
-Urn U
-Urn A
A-2. Tender Offer
An international research center has presented the contract for setting up its technical
equipment for tender. As an entrepreneur, you would like to take part in the tendering
procedure. Therefore, you would like to hand in an offer. The committee responsible for
awarding the contracts will favor the company with the most attractive offer. Completing
the order (if you get it) will cost your company $100,000. You are aware that there are
numerous competitors who will hand in offers for the same project. From your
experiences with other tendering procedures you can derive probabilities for you to be
awarded the contract. Which offer are you going to make?
-You submit a proposal at a price of $115,000. The chances that you will be awarded the
contract are around 70%.
-You submit a proposal at a price of $120,000. The chances that you will be awarded the
contract are around 60%.
-You submit a proposal at a price of $125,000. The chances that you will be awarded the
contract are around 50%.
A-3. MP3–Player
Since your newly purchased portable CD–MP3–Player fell into the water on your last
boat trip, you are planning on buying a new one. Which model do you favor as a
replacement?
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-You decide in favor of a Panasonic (55 h play time, $69 ).
-You decide in favor of a Philips (35 h play time, $49 ).
-You decide in favor of an iRiver (70 h play time, $99 ).
A-4. Market Entry
Imagine yourself the owner of the import–export company “No Boundaries”; Japan is the
only foreign market you have operated in so far. Thanks to recent success, you are now
able to expand. The following languages are excellently spoken by you or someone in
your company: German, Japanese, English, French, Spanish, and Chinese. The market
entry in each of the candidate countries is related to different success and risk potentials.
The investment needed to expand into any of the candidate countries is the same and you
can only afford to enter one single additional market. Each of the following alternatives
can be described by two characteristic figures. The first figure stands for the expected
mean value of the annual Return on Capital after tax for the next five years (a suitable
figure for the profit). The second figure describes the probability of canceling the
engagement in the new foreign market prematurely due to enduring losses.
Country
Return on Capital
Risk of Failure
Argentina
40%
20%
Australia
30%
15%
Belgium
20%
10%
Which country would you expand to?
-Argentina
-Australia
-Belgium
A-5. Digital camera
Imagine yourself sitting in a street cafe´ in Florence thinking of all the great things you
have been lucky enough to experience today. That same second you experience one of
the possible dark sides of a holiday trip when you catch a glimpse of a thief vanishing
with your camera. You have already planned an evening with your friends when you
return home, and you do not want to miss showing the photos you were going to take on
tomorrow’s sightseeing tour. Therefore, you decide to immediately buy a new camera on
the Piazza. What camera are you going to buy?
-Digital camera A: 512 MB memory, 5 mega pixel, price: $499 .
-Digital camera B: 256 MB memory, 3 mega pixel, price: $299 .
-Digital camera C: 256 MB memory, 2 mega pixel, price: $199 .
A-6. Business software
Imagine yourself being the owner and manager of Berlin Ltd. which has a market share
of 10% with its innovative product. Since Berlin Ltd is not able to meet all the demand
for this innovative product, and because it is difficult to quickly acquire more personnel,
you have decided to optimize the company’s internal workflows. Therefore, you need a
business software solution. After some market research you consider three software
solutions. Switching from your old software to any of the new solutions implies
switching costs which are the same for all three solutions: A, B and C. Which of the
following software packages would you purchase?
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-You decide in favor of software A. It is relatively expensive but very flexible and will
also meet future requirements.
-You decide in favor of software B. It has a medium price and wholly meets all present
requirements.
-You decide in favor of software C. It has a relatively low price and meets most present
requirements but with a few acceptable flaws
A-7. Office rental
Due to a lack of space, you, as the owner of a service company, decide to rent new office
space. After having looked at different locations, there are three that could work. The
office spaces are located in different areas of the city, have different layouts, and have
different rental costs. Which office space will you rent?
-Office accommodation A: average area, average layout, high price.
-Office accommodation B: bad area, very good layout, medium price.
-Office accommodation C: good area, inconvenient layout, good price.
A-8. Design Choice
Your company is working on the design of a new jet engine. You have been tasked with
selection of a fuel pump for this engine. As with any flight item, lower weight is
preferred. Mass flow rate of fuel through the pump, another important factor, is desired to
be as high as is feasible. Finally, the mean time between failures (MTBF), or how long
the pump on average operates before it breaks, is desired to be as high as possible. A
commonly used steel pump is relatively heavy, has a good flow rate, and has a relatively
high MTBF. Another common pump made from aluminum is lighter than the steel pump,
has a high flow rate, but has a lower MTBF. A third type of pump, made from a newly
developed titanium alloy, is lightweight and has a high flow rate in testing thus far. The
new pump passed some basic qualification testing but has not been tested enough to
establish a MTBF; the MTBF is estimated to be 1000 hrs. Please select one of the three
fuel pumps below based on the given parameters.
Pump A (steel) - 52 Lbs weight, 54 gpm flow rate, 1000 hrs MTBF
Pump B (aluminum) - 48 Lbs weight, 55 gpm flow rate, 800 hrs MTBF
Pump C (titanium) - 43 Lbs weight, 60 gpm flow rate, Est. 1000 hrs MTBF
A-9. Your Work Environment
We would like to categorize your current work environment. Read the definitions of
Team and Working Group below and identify where you believe your group falls on the
scale.
A “Team” can be defined as a group of individuals who have complementary skills, are
committed to a common purpose or goal for which they are mutually accountable, and
use a synergistic approach for interdependent task accomplishment. This group pursues
consensus or near-consensus decision making.
A “Work Group” can be defined as a structured unit of individuals who strive to meet
some defined objective but do not actively pursue interdependent tasks; members share
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information at interface points and are judged and rewarded independently; and members
are exclusively responsible for decisions within their area of expertise.
As best as you can, indicate where your group falls on the scale:
-Strong tendencies of a Work Group
-Moderate tendencies of a Work Group
-Weak tendencies of a Work Group
-Unable to classify as either a Team or Work Group
-Weak tendencies of a Team
-Moderate tendencies of a Team
-Strong tendencies of a Team

Demographic Information:
Highest Education Attained: High School Diploma/Some College/Bachelor’s
Degree/Master’s Degree or higher
Do you have an engineering degree: Yes / No
Current Occupation: Engineering /Science / Business (Contracts, Management,
Marketing, Finance, Economics, etc.) / Arts / Other
Years Experience in current field: 0-5/6-10/11-15 / 16-20 /20+
Do you currently manage or supervise (i.e. direct reports) engineers, or have you
previously in your career: Yes/No
The majority of your professional career has been in: Government / Government
Contractor / Private Industry / Self-employment / Other
Gender: M/F
Race: American Indian or Alaskan Native / Asian / Black or African-American /
Hispanic or Latino / Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander / White (non-Hispanic) / Other /
Multi-Racial
Age: 19-29/30-39/40-49/50-59/60+
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Decision making Questionnaire (Version B)
Instructions:
The following survey takes approximately 10 minutes to complete. For each question,
please select the answer that you feel would best reflect your own choice in the situation
described based on the provided information. Following the nine survey questions is a
brief demographic questionnaire.
Participation in this survey is voluntary. All responses are anonymous and no identifying
information will be collected. All survey participants must be age 19 or older. By
completing the survey you are indicating that you are age 19 or older. If you choose not
to complete the survey you are considered to have withdrawn from participation. Thank
you for your participation.
Survey Questions:
B-1. Drawing Marbles
You have the opportunity to draw a marble from an urn to win $100. There are two urns
to choose from. Each urn contains exactly 100 marbles. Draw of a black marble wins.
The first Urn (Urn U), has exactly 50 red marbles and 50 black marbles. The second Urn
(Urn A), has between 0 and 100 red marbles, with a complementary number of black
marbles. You currently have a ticket to draw from Urn A, but you may exchange this to
draw from Urn U if you so desire. Which draw will you make?
-Retain your current ticket and draw from Urn A
-Exchange your current ticket for a ticket to draw from Urn U
B-2. Tender Offer
An international research center has presented the contract for setting up its technical
equipment for tender. As an entrepreneur, you would like to take part in the tendering
procedure. Therefore, you would like to hand in an offer. The committee responsible for
awarding the contracts will favor the company with the most attractive offer. Completing
the order (if you get it) will cost your company $100,000. You are aware that there are
numerous competitors who will hand in offers for this same project. From your
experiences with other tendering procedures you can derive probabilities for you to be
awarded the contract. For former offers you always calculated a margin of 15 % above
your cost. Which offer will you make?
-You submit a proposal at a price of $115,000 . The chances that you will be awarded the
contract are around 70%.
-You submit a proposal at a price of $120,000 . The chances that you will be awarded the
contract are around 60%.
-You submit a proposal at a price of $125,000 . The chances that you will be awarded the
contract are around 50%.
B-3. MP3–Player
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Since your newly purchased portable CD–MP3–Player (from Panasonic) fell into the
water on your last boat trip, you are planning on buying a new one. Which model do you
favor as a replacement?
-You decide in favor of a Panasonic (55 h play time, $69 ).
-You decide in favor of a Philips (35 h play time, $49 ).
-You decide in favor of an iRiver (70 h play time, $99 ).
B-4. Market Entry
Imagine yourself the owner of the import–export company “No Boundaries”; Great
Britain is the only foreign market you have operated in so far. Thanks to recent success
you are now able to expand. The following languages are excellently spoken by you or
someone in your company: German, Japanese, English, French, Spanish, and Chinese.
The market entry in each of the candidate countries is related to different success and risk
potentials. The investment needed to expand into any of the candidate countries is the
same and you can only afford to enter one single additional market. Each of the following
alternatives can be described by two characteristic figures. The first figure stands for the
expected mean value of the annual Return on Capital after tax for the next five years (a
suitable figure for the profit). The second figure describes the probability of canceling the
engagement in the new foreign market prematurely due to enduring losses.
Country
Return on Capital
Risk of Failure
Argentina
40%
20%
Australia
30%
15%
Belgium
20%
10%
Which country would you expand to?
-Argentina
-Australia
-Belgium
B-5. Digital camera
Imagine yourself sitting in a street cafe´ in Florence thinking of all the great things you
have been lucky enough to experience today. That same second you experience one of
the possible dark sides of a holiday trip when you catch a glimpse of a thief vanishing
with your camera. You have already planned an evening with your friends when you
return home, and you do not want to miss showing the photos you were going to take on
tomorrow’s sightseeing tour. Therefore, you decide to immediately buy a new camera on
the Piazza. Your last photos were taken with digital camera A. What camera are you
going to buy?
-Digital camera A: 512 MB memory, 5 mega pixel, price: $499 .
-Digital camera B: 256 MB memory, 3 mega pixel, price: $299 .
-Digital camera C: 256 MB memory, 2 mega pixel, price: $199 .
B-6. Business software
Imagine yourself being the owner and manager of Berlin Ltd. which has a market share
of 10% with its innovative product. Since Berlin Ltd is not able to meet all the demand
for this innovative product, and because it is difficult to quickly acquire more personnel,
you have decided to optimize the company’s internal workflows. Therefore, you need a
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business software solution. After some market research you consider three software
solutions. Your company is currently using an older version of software package B,
which does not comply with the present requirements anymore. Switching from your old
software to any of the new solutions implies switching costs which are the same for all
three solutions: A, B, and C. Which of the following software packages would you
purchase?
-You decide in favor of software A. It is relatively expensive but very flexible and will
also meet future requirements.
-You decide in favor of software B. It has a medium price and wholly meets all present
requirements.
-You decide in favor of software C. It has a relatively low price and meets most present
requirements but with a few acceptable flaws.
B-7. Office rental
Due to a lack of space, you, as the owner of a service company, decide to rent new office
space. After having looked at different locations, there are three that could work. The
office spaces are located in different areas of the city, have different layouts, and have
different rental costs. Your current offices are located in an average area. Which office
space will you rent?
-Office accommodation A: average area, average layout, high price.
-Office accommodation B: bad area, very good layout, medium price.
-Office accommodation C: good area, inconvenient layout, good price.

B-8. Design Choice
Your company is working on the design of a new jet engine. You have been tasked with
selection of a fuel pump for this engine. As with any flight item, lower weight is
preferred. Mass flow rate of fuel through the pump, another important factor, is desired to
be as high as is feasible. Finally, the mean time between failures (MTBF), or how long
the pump on average operates before it breaks, is desired to be as high as possible. A
commonly used steel pump is relatively heavy, has a good flow rate, and has a relatively
high MTBF. Another common pump made from aluminum is lighter than the steel pump,
has a high flow rate, but has a lower MTBF. A third type of pump, made from a newly
developed titanium alloy, is lightweight and has a high flow rate in testing thus far. The
new pump passed some basic qualification testing but has not been tested enough to
establish a MTBF; the MTBF is estimated to be 1000 hrs. The baseline design includes
Pump A (steel). Please select one of the three fuel pumps below based on the given
parameters.
Pump A (steel) - 52 Lbs weight, 54 gpm flow rate, 1000 hrs MTBF
Pump B (aluminum) - 48 Lbs weight, 55 gpm flow rate, 800 hrs MTBF
Pump C (titanium) - 43 Lbs weight, 60 gpm flow rate, Est. 1000 hrs MTBF
B-9. Your Work Environment
We would like to categorize your current work environment. Read the definitions of
Team and Working Group below and identify where you believe your group falls on the
scale.
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A “Team” can be defined as a group of individuals who have complementary skills, are
committed to a common purpose or goal for which they are mutually accountable, and
use a synergistic approach for interdependent task accomplishment. This group pursues
consensus or near-consensus decision making.
A “Work Group” can be defined as a structured unit of individuals who strive to meet
some defined objective but do not actively pursue interdependent tasks; members share
information at interface points and are judged and rewarded independently; and members
are exclusively responsible for decisions within their area of expertise.
As best as you can, indicate where your group falls on the scale:
-Strong tendencies of a Work Group
-Moderate tendencies of a Work Group
-Weak tendencies of a Work Group
-Unable to classify as either a Team or Work Group
-Weak tendencies of a Team
-Moderate tendencies of a Team
-Strong tendencies of a Team
Demographic Information:
Highest Education Attained: High School Diploma/Some College/Bachelor’s
Degree/Master’s Degree or higher
Do you have an engineering degree: Yes / No
Current Occupation: Engineering /Science / Business (Contracts, Management,
Marketing, Finance, Economics, etc.) / Arts / Other
Years Experience in current field: 0-5/6-10/11-15 / 16-20 /20+
Do you currently manage or supervise (i.e. direct reports) engineers, or have you
previously in your career: Yes/No
The majority of your professional career has been in: Government / Government
Contractor / Private Industry / Self-employment / Other
Gender: M/F
Race: American Indian or Alaskan Native / Asian / Black or African-American /
Hispanic or Latino / Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander / White (non-Hispanic) / Other /
Multi-Racial
Age: 19-29/30-39/40-49/50-59/60+
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Decision making Questionnaire (Version C)
Instructions:
The following survey takes approximately 10 minutes to complete. For each question,
please select the answer that you feel would best reflect your own choice in the situation
described based on the provided information. Following the nine survey questions is a
brief demographic questionnaire.
Participation in this survey is voluntary. All responses are anonymous and no identifying
information will be collected. All survey participants must be age 19 or older. By
completing the survey you are indicating that you are age 19 or older. If you choose not
to complete the survey you are considered to have withdrawn from participation. Thank
you for your participation.
Survey Questions:
C-1. Drawing Marbles
You have the opportunity to draw a marble from an urn to win $100. There are two urns
to choose from. Each urn contains exactly 100 marbles. Draw of a black marble wins.
The first Urn (Urn U), has exactly 50 red marbles and 50 black marbles. The second Urn
(Urn A), has between 0 and 100 red marbles, with a complementary number of black
marbles. Which urn would you prefer to draw from?
-Urn U
-Urn A
C-2. Tender Offer
An international research center has presented the contract for setting up its technical
equipment for tender. As an entrepreneur, you would like to take part in the tendering
procedure. Therefore, you would like to hand in an offer. The committee responsible for
awarding the contracts will favor the company with the most attractive offer. Completing
the order (if you get it) will cost your company$100,000 . You are aware that there are
numerous competitors who will hand in offers for this same project. From your
experiences with other tendering procedures you can derive probabilities for you to be
awarded the contract. For former offers you always calculated a margin of 25 % above
your cost. Which offer will you make?
-You submit a proposal at a price of $115,000 . The chances that you will be awarded the
contract are around 70%.
-You submit a proposal at a price of $120,000 . The chances that you will be awarded the
contract are around 60%.
-You submit a proposal at a price of $125,000 . The chances that you will be awarded the
contract are around 50%.
C-3. MP3–Player
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Since your newly purchased portable CD–MP3–Player (from Philips) fell into the water
on your last boat trip, you are planning on buying a new one. Which model do you favor
as a replacement?
-You decide in favor of a Panasonic (55 h play time, $69 ).
-You decide in favor of a Philips (35 h play time, $49 ).
-You decide in favor of an iRiver (70 h play time, $99 ).
C-4. Market Entry
Imagine yourself the owner of the import–export company “No Boundaries”; France is
the only foreign market you have operated in so far. Thanks to recent success you are
now able to expand. The following languages are excellently spoken by you or someone
in your company: German, Japanese, English, French, Spanish, and Chinese. The market
entry in each of the candidate countries is related to different success and risk potentials.
The investment needed to expand into any of the candidate countries is the same and you
can only afford to enter one single additional market. Each of the following alternatives
can be described by two characteristic figures. The first figure stands for the expected
mean value of the annual Return on Capital after tax for the next five years (a suitable
figure for the profit). The second figure describes the probability of canceling the
engagement in the new foreign market prematurely due to enduring losses.
Country
Return on Capital
Risk of Failure
Argentina
40%
20%
Australia
30%
15%
Belgium
20%
10%
Which country would you expand to?
-Argentina
-Australia
-Belgium
C-5. Digital camera
Imagine yourself sitting in a street cafe´ in Florence thinking of all the great things you
have been lucky enough to experience today. That same second you experience one of
the possible dark sides of a holiday trip when you catch a glimpse of a thief vanishing
with your camera. You have already planned an evening with your friends when you
return home, and you do not want to miss showing the photos you were going to take on
tomorrow’s sightseeing tour. Therefore, you decide to immediately buy a new camera on
the Piazza. Your last photos were taken with digital camera C. What camera are you
going to buy?
-Digital camera A: 512 MB memory, 5 mega pixel, price: $499 .
-Digital camera B: 256 MB memory, 3 mega pixel, price: $299 .
-Digital camera C: 256 MB memory, 2 mega pixel, price: $199 .
C-6. Business software
Imagine yourself being the owner and manager of Berlin Ltd. which has a market share
of 10% with its innovative product. Since Berlin Ltd is not able to meet all the demand
for this innovative product, and because it is difficult to quickly acquire more personnel,
you have decided to optimize the company’s internal workflows. Therefore, you need a
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business software solution. After some market research you consider three software
solutions. Your company is currently using an older version of software package A,
which does not comply with the present requirements anymore. Switching from your old
software to any of the new solutions implies switching costs which are the same for all
three solutions: A, B, and C. Which of the following software packages would you
purchase?
-You decide in favor of software A. It is relatively expensive but very flexible and will
also meet future requirements.
-You decide in favor of software B. It has a medium price and wholly meets all present
requirements.
-You decide in favor of software C. It has a relatively low price and meets most present
requirements but with a few acceptable flaws.
C-7. Office rental
Due to a lack of space, you, as the owner of a service company, decide to rent new office
space. After having looked at different locations, there are three that could work. The
office spaces are located in different areas of the city, have different layouts, and have
different rental costs. Your current offices are located in a bad area. Which office space
will you rent?
-Office accommodation A: average area, average layout, high price.
-Office accommodation B: bad area, very good layout, medium price.
-Office accommodation C: good area, inconvenient layout, good price.

C-8. Design Choice
Your company is working on the design of a new jet engine. You have been tasked with
selection of a fuel pump for this engine. As with any flight item, lower weight is
preferred. Mass flow rate of fuel through the pump, another important factor, is desired to
be as high as is feasible. Finally, the mean time between failures (MTBF), or how long
the pump on average operates before it breaks, is desired to be as high as possible. A
commonly used steel pump is relatively heavy, has a good flow rate, and has a relatively
high MTBF. Another common pump made from aluminum is lighter than the steel pump,
has a high flow rate, but has a lower MTBF. A third type of pump, made from a newly
developed titanium alloy, is lightweight and has a high flow rate in testing thus far. The
new pump passed some basic qualification testing but has not been tested enough to
establish a MTBF; the MTBF is estimated to be 1000 hrs. The baseline design includes
Pump B (aluminum). Please select one of the three fuel pumps below based on the given
parameters.
Pump A (steel) - 52 Lbs weight, 54 gpm flow rate, 1000 hrs MTBF
Pump B (aluminum) - 48 Lbs weight, 55 gpm flow rate, 800 hrs MTBF
Pump C (titanium) - 43 Lbs weight, 60 gpm flow rate, Est. 1000 hrs MTBF
C-9. Your Work Environment
We would like to categorize your current work environment. Read the definitions of
Team and Working Group below and identify where you believe your group falls on the
scale.
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A “Team” can be defined as a group of individuals who have complementary skills, are
committed to a common purpose or goal for which they are mutually accountable, and
use a synergistic approach for interdependent task accomplishment. This group pursues
consensus or near-consensus decision making.
A “Work Group” can be defined as a structured unit of individuals who strive to meet
some defined objective but do not actively pursue interdependent tasks; members share
information at interface points and are judged and rewarded independently; and members
are exclusively responsible for decisions within their area of expertise.
As best as you can, indicate where your group falls on the scale:
-Strong tendencies of a Work Group
-Moderate tendencies of a Work Group
-Weak tendencies of a Work Group
-Unable to classify as either a Team or Work Group
-Weak tendencies of a Team
-Moderate tendencies of a Team
-Strong tendencies of a Team

Demographic Information:
Highest Education Attained: High School Diploma/Some College/Bachelor’s
Degree/Master’s Degree or higher
Do you have an engineering degree: Yes / No
Current Occupation: Engineering /Science / Business (Contracts, Management,
Marketing, Finance, Economics, etc.) / Arts / Other
Years Experience in current field: 0-5/6-10/11-15 / 16-20 /20+
Do you currently manage or supervise (i.e. direct reports) engineers, or have you
previously in your career: Yes/No
The majority of your professional career has been in: Government / Government
Contractor / Private Industry / Self-employment / Other
Gender: M/F
Race: American Indian or Alaskan Native / Asian / Black or African-American /
Hispanic or Latino / Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander / White (non-Hispanic) / Other /
Multi-Racial
Age: 19-29/30-39/40-49/50-59/60+
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Decision making Questionnaire (Version D)
Instructions:
The following survey takes approximately 10 minutes to complete. For each question,
please select the answer that you feel would best reflect your own choice in the situation
described based on the provided information. Following the nine survey questions is a
brief demographic questionnaire.
Participation in this survey is voluntary. All responses are anonymous and no identifying
information will be collected. All survey participants must be age 19 or older. By
completing the survey you are indicating that you are age 19 or older. If you choose not
to complete the survey you are considered to have withdrawn from participation. Thank
you for your participation.
Survey Questions:
D-1. Drawing Marbles
You have the opportunity to draw a marble from an urn to win $100. There are two urns
to choose from. Each urn contains exactly 100 marbles. Draw of a black marble wins.
The first Urn (Urn U), has exactly 50 red marbles and 50 black marbles. The second Urn
(Urn A), has between 0 and 100 red marbles, with a complementary number of black
marbles. You currently have a ticket to draw from Urn A, but you may exchange this to
draw from Urn U if you so desire. Which draw will you make?
-Retain your current ticket and draw from Urn A
-Exchange your current ticket for a ticket to draw from Urn U
D-2. Tender Offer
An international research center has presented the contract for setting up its technical
equipment for tender. As an entrepreneur, you would like to take part in the tendering
procedure. Therefore, you would like to hand in an offer. The committee responsible for
awarding the contracts will favor the company with the most attractive offer. Completing
the order (if you get it) will cost your company$100,000 . You are aware that there are
numerous competitors who will hand in offers for this same project. From your
experiences with other tendering procedures you can derive probabilities for you to be
awarded the contract. For former offers you always calculated a margin of 20 % above
your cost. Which offer will you make?
-You submit a proposal at a price of $115,000 . The chances that you will be awarded the
contract are around 70%.
-You submit a proposal at a price of $120,000 . The chances that you will be awarded the
contract are around 60%.
-You submit a proposal at a price of $125,000 . The chances that you will be awarded the
contract are around 50%.
D-3. MP3–Player
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Since your newly purchased portable CD–MP3–Player (from iRiver) fell into the water
on your last boat trip, you are planning on buying a new one. Which model do you favor
as a replacement?
-You decide in favor of a Panasonic (55 h play time, $69 ).
-You decide in favor of a Philips (35 h play time, $49 ).
-You decide in favor of an iRiver (70 h play time, $99 ).
D-4. Market Entry
Imagine yourself the owner of the import–export company “No Boundaries”; Colombia
is the only foreign market you have operated in so far. Thanks to recent success you are
now able to expand. The following languages are excellently spoken by you or someone
in your company: German, Japanese, English, French, Spanish, and Chinese. The market
entry in each of the candidate countries is related to different success and risk potentials.
The investment needed to expand into any of the candidate countries is the same and you
can only afford to enter one single additional market. Each of the following alternatives
can be described by two characteristic figures. The first figure stands for the expected
mean value of the annual Return on Capital after tax for the next five years (a suitable
figure for the profit). The second figure describes the probability of canceling the
engagement in the new foreign market prematurely due to enduring losses.
Country
Return on Capital
Risk of Failure
Argentina
40%
20%
Australia
30%
15%
Belgium
20%
10%
Which country would you expand to?
-Argentina
-Australia
-Belgium
D-5. Digital camera
Imagine yourself sitting in a street cafe´ in Florence thinking of all the great things you
have been lucky enough to experience today. That same second you experience one of
the possible dark sides of a holiday trip when you catch a glimpse of a thief vanishing
with your camera. You have already planned an evening with your friends when you
return home, and you do not want to miss showing the photos you were going to take on
tomorrow’s sightseeing tour. Therefore, you decide to immediately buy a new camera on
the Piazza. Your last photos were taken with digital camera B. What camera are you
going to buy?
-Digital camera A: 512 MB memory, 5 mega pixel, price: $499 .
-Digital camera B: 256 MB memory, 3 mega pixel, price: $299 .
-Digital camera C: 256 MB memory, 2 mega pixel, price: $199 .
D-6. Business software
Imagine yourself being the owner and manager of Berlin Ltd. which has a market share
of 10% with its innovative product. Since Berlin Ltd is not able to meet all the demand
for this innovative product, and because it is difficult to quickly acquire more personnel,
you have decided to optimize the company’s internal workflows. Therefore, you need a
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business software solution. After some market research you consider three software
solutions. Your company is currently using an older version of software package C,
which does not comply with the present requirements anymore. Switching from your old
software to any of the new solutions implies switching costs which are the same for all
three solutions: A, B, and C. Which of the following software packages would you
purchase?
-You decide in favor of software A. It is relatively expensive but very flexible and will
also meet future requirements.
-You decide in favor of software B. It has a medium price and wholly meets all present
requirements.
-You decide in favor of software C. It has a relatively low price and meets most present
requirements but with a few acceptable flaws.
D-7. Office rental
Due to a lack of space, you, as the owner of a service company, decide to rent new office
space. After having looked at different locations, there are three that could work. The
office spaces are located in different areas of the city, have different layouts, and have
different rental costs. Your current offices are located in agood area. Which office space
will you rent?
-Office accommodation A: average area, average layout, high price.
-Office accommodation B: bad area, very good layout, medium price.
-Office accommodation C: good area, inconvenient layout, good price.

D-8. Design Choice
Your company is working on the design of a new jet engine. You have been tasked with
selection of a fuel pump for this engine. As with any flight item, lower weight is
preferred. Mass flow rate of fuel through the pump, another important factor, is desired to
be as high as is feasible. Finally, the mean time between failures (MTBF), or how long
the pump on average operates before it breaks, is desired to be as high as possible. A
commonly used steel pump is relatively heavy, has a good flow rate, and has a relatively
high MTBF. Another common pump made from aluminum is lighter than the steel pump,
has a high flow rate, but has a lower MTBF. A third type of pump, made from a newly
developed titanium alloy, is lightweight and has a high flow rate in testing thus far. The
new pump passed some basic qualification testing but has not been tested enough to
establish a MTBF; the MTBF is estimated to be 1000 hrs. The baseline design includes
Pump C (titanium). Please select one of the three fuel pumps below based on the given
parameters.
Pump A (steel) - 52 Lbs weight, 54 gpm flow rate, 1000 hrs MTBF
Pump B (aluminum) - 48 Lbs weight, 55 gpm flow rate, 800 hrs MTBF
Pump C (titanium) - 43 Lbs weight, 60 gpm flow rate, Est. 1000 hrs MTBF
D-9. Your Work Environment
We would like to categorize your current work environment. Read the definitions of
Team and Working Group below and identify where you believe your group falls on the
scale.
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A “Team” can be defined as a group of individuals who have complementary skills, are
committed to a common purpose or goal for which they are mutually accountable, and
use a synergistic approach for interdependent task accomplishment. This group pursues
consensus or near-consensus decision making.
A “Work Group” can be defined as a structured unit of individuals who strive to meet
some defined objective but do not actively pursue interdependent tasks; members share
information at interface points and are judged and rewarded independently; and members
are exclusively responsible for decisions within their area of expertise.
As best as you can, indicate where your group falls on the scale:
-Strong tendencies of a Work Group
-Moderate tendencies of a Work Group
-Weak tendencies of a Work Group
-Unable to classify as either a Team or Work Group
-Weak tendencies of a Team
-Moderate tendencies of a Team
-Strong tendencies of a Team

Demographic Information:
Highest Education Attained: High School Diploma/Some College/Bachelor’s
Degree/Master’s Degree or higher
Do you have an engineering degree: Yes / No
Current Occupation: Engineering /Science / Business (Contracts, Management,
Marketing, Finance, Economics, etc.) / Arts / Other
Years Experience in current field: 0-5/6-10/11-15 / 16-20 /20+
Do you currently manage or supervise (i.e. direct reports) engineers, or have you
previously in your career: Yes/No
The majority of your professional career has been in: Government / Government
Contractor / Private Industry / Self-employment / Other
Gender: M/F
Race: American Indian or Alaskan Native / Asian / Black or African-American /
Hispanic or Latino / Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander / White (non-Hispanic) / Other /
Multi-Racial
Age: 19-29/30-39/40-49/50-59/60+
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APPENDIX B

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS STEPS
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Table B.1: Analysis Steps
1. Ambiguity Aversion
1a. χ2 test for independence (engineers)
1b. χ2 test for independence (non-engineers)
1c. 2-proportion test (engineers)
1d. 2-proportion test (non-engineers)
1e. 2-proportion test (engineers vs non-engineers, version A)
1f. 2-proportion test (engineers vs non-engineers, version B)
2. Status Quo Bias
2a. χ2 test for independence (engineers)
2b. χ2 test for independence (non-engineers)
2c. 2-proportion test - engineers (each option, SQ vs neut and SQ vs ASQ)
2d. 2-proportion test - non-engineers (each option, SQ vs neut and SQ vs ASQ)
2e. Discriminant Analysis - engineers vs non-engineers
2f. MANOVA - Survey version (engineers only)
2g. Discriminant Analysis - Survey version (engineers only)
3. Status Quo Bias - Design
3a. χ2 test for independence (engineers)
3b. χ2 test for independence (non-engineers)
3c. 2-proportion test - engineers (each option, SQ vs neut and SQ vs ASQ)
3d. 2-proportion test - non-engineers (each option, SQ vs neut and SQ vs ASQ)
4. Engineering Managers
4a. Ambiguity Aversion – 2-proportion test (engineers, engineers vs eng managers, version A)
4b. Ambiguity Aversion – 2-proportion test (engineers, engineers vs eng managers, version B)
4c. SQB - Discriminant Analysis (engineers, compare to Cpro)
5. Work Environment
5a. Ambiguity Aversion – 2-proportion test (engineers, team vs wg, neglect neutral, version A)
5b. Ambiguity Aversion – 2-proportion test (engineers, team vs wg, neglect neutral, version B)
5c. SQB - Discriminant Analysis (engineers, compare to Cpro)
6. Demographics
6a. Discriminant Analysis - SQB - Government vs Non-Government (engineers)
6b. Discriminant Analysis - SQB - Education (engineers)
6c. Discriminant Analysis - SQB - Gender (engineers)
6d. Discriminant Analysis - SQB - Race (engineers)
6e. Discriminant Analysis - SQB - Age (engineers)
6f. Discriminant Analysis - SQB - Experience (engineers)
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APPENDIX C

DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS OF NON-SIGNIFICANT DEMOGRAPHIC
FACTORS

The demographic factors of gender, race/ethnicity and government status were
found not to be significant in impacting status quo bias according to the discriminant
analysis performed on these factors. The results of these analyses are presented in this
appendix. The summary of discriminant analysis on gender can be seen in Table C.1. The
discriminant analysis was slightly better than random selection, but not significantly so in
any survey version. The summary of discriminant analysis on race/ethnicity can be seen
in Table C.2. Due to the relatively small number of respondents in each minority group,
the minority samples were combined to form a non-white sample for the purposes of
analysis. The analysis was actually worse on two surveys than guessing, and was not
significantly better in the other two surveys. The summary of discriminant analysis
results on government status can be seen in Table C.3. The analysis did cross the
threshold for significant improvement in survey A; however it did not in any other survey
and was worse than guessing in the remaining three versions.
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Table C.1: Discriminant Analysis on Gender
Survey
A
B
C
D

Proportion
Male Female Total
Correct
0.733
23
7
30
0.719
24
8
32
0.786
24
4
28
0.806
31
5
36

Cpro

% Better

0.642
0.625
0.755
0.761

14.1%
15.0%
4.1%
5.9%

Table C.2: Discriminant Analysis on Race/Ethnicity
Survey
A
B
C
D

Proportion
Correct
0.6
0.875
0.75
0.75

White
26
27
23
31

NonTotal
White
4
30
5
32
5
28
5
36

Cpro

% Better

0.769
0.736
0.707
0.761

-22.0%
18.8%
6.1%
-1.4%

Table C.3: Discriminant Analysis on Government Status
Survey
A
B
C
D

Proportion
Correct
0.700
0.344
0.393
0.500

Government
14
13
13
17

NonTotal
Government
16
30
19
32
15
28
19
36
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Cpro

% Better

0.502
0.518
0.503
0.502

39.4%
-33.5%
-21.8%
-0.3%

APPENDIX D

INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL LETTER

128

129

APPENDIX E

PERMISSION TO USE STATUS QUO BIAS INSTRUMENT
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